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ABSTRACT
Individual privacy rights are often at the heart of information privacy and data
protection laws. The most comprehensive set of rights, from the European
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), includes the right to access,
right to rectification (correction), right to erasure, right to restriction, right to
data portability, right to object, and right to not be subject to automated
decisions. Privacy laws around the world include many of these rights in various
forms.
In this article, I contend that although rights are an important component of
privacy regulation, rights are often asked to do far more work than they are
capable of doing. Rights can only give individuals a small amount of power.
Ultimately, rights are at most capable of being a supporting actor, a small
component of a much larger architecture. I advance three reasons why rights
cannot serve as the bulwark of privacy protection. First, rights put too much onus
on individuals when many privacy problems are systematic. Second, individuals
lack the time and expertise to make difficult decisions about privacy, and rights
cannot practically be exercised at scale with the number of organizations than
process people’s data. Third, privacy cannot be protected by focusing solely on
the atomistic individual. The personal data of many people is interrelated, and
people’s decisions about their own data have implications for the privacy of other
people.
The main goal of providing privacy rights aims to provide individuals with
control over their personal data. However, effective privacy protection involves
not just facilitating individual control, but also bringing the collection,
processing, and transfer of personal data under control. Privacy rights are not
designed to achieve the latter goal; and they fail at the former goal.
After discussing these overarching reasons why rights are insufficient for the
oversized role they currently play in privacy regulation, I discuss the common
privacy rights and why each falls short of providing significant privacy
protection. For each right, I propose broader structural measures that can
achieve its underlying goals in a more systematic, rigorous, and less haphazard
way.
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INTRODUCTION
Individual privacy rights are enshrined at the heart of most information privacy
and data protection laws.2 Countless privacy laws in the United States and
worldwide provide individuals with rights in their personal data, such as a right to
information about their data, rights to access and correct their data, a right to
delete their data, and a right to opt out of certain uses of their data, among others.
Generally, there are two broad types of substantive elements in privacy laws: rights
and duties. Rights are typically invoked by individuals to have knowledge and
control regarding their personal data. Duties involve requirements for entities that
collect, use, or transfer personal data.
Rights are the centerpiece of many privacy laws. Many duties of privacy laws are
designed to help administer the rights that the law provides. For example, the
European Union’s the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides for
seven individual rights. More than 140 countries now have comprehensive privacy
laws,3 most of which were designed based on the GDPR or its predecessor, the EU
Data Protection Directive. Under the GDPR and many other laws, data subjects
may make rights requests called “data subject access requests” (DSARs).
Complying with DSARs requires being able to locate relevant personal data to
provide to data subjects, verify the identities of data subjects, process requests to
delete or to stop processing data, and so on. Many elements of privacy laws involve
mechanisms to ensure that organizations effectively administer these rights.
Privacy laws have always relied heavily on rights, and the trend is increasing.
Comprehensive privacy laws worldwide have typically included many privacy
rights.4 Many privacy laws in the United States rely heavily on privacy rights. For
example, under the California Consumer Privacy Act’s (CCPA), the central set of
protections involve a robust right to information – providing individuals with
extensive information about the collection and use of their personal data – as well
as a strong right to opt out and a right to delete data.5 A key goal of the law involves
“putting consumers back in charge of their own data.”6
A main impetus for rights involves a desire to address the problem that individuals
lack much power in their relationships with the gigantic organizations that have
massive digital dossiers of their personal data.7 As stated by the famous 1973
government report on privacy that spawned the principles animating many privacy
rights, computer databases are upending “the mutuality of record-generating
relationships to assign the institution a unilateral role in making decisions about
In this article, I use terms “information privacy” and “data protection” synonymously. The EU uses
the term “data protection,’ as do many laws based on EU law. In the US, the term “privacy” is
predominantly used.
3 Katitza Rodriguez and Veridiana Alimontis, A Look-Back and Ahead on Data Protection in Latin
America and Spain, EFF (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/look-back-andahead-data-protection-latin-america-and-spain.
4 See Jamaica, Data Protection Act. See also Graham Greenleaf, Jamaica Adopts a Post-GDPR Data
Privacy Law, 167 Privacy Laws & Business International Report 1, 5-8 (Aug. 16, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3712745.
5 CCPA 1798.105 (right to delete), 1798.106 (right to correct), 1798.110 & 1798.115 (right to know),
1798.120 (right to opt out of sale or sharing), 1798.121 (right to limit use or disclosure of sensitive
info).
6 Californians for Consumer Privacy, https://www.caprivacy.org/.
7 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004).
2
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the content and use of its records about individuals.”8 As the report aptly observed,
individuals are increasingly powerless and vulnerable as their personal data is
gathered, aggregated, transferred, analyzed, and used to make decisions affecting
their lives. I will call this problem “data disempowerment.” The response of
privacy laws has been to attempt to put individuals back in control over their
personal data by giving them rights.
In this article, I argue that although rights are an important component of privacy
regulation, rights are often asked to do far more work than they are capable of
doing. Privacy rights cannot solve the problem of data disempowerment. The
ability of individuals to exercise control over their personal data is quite limited;
there is a ceiling to individual control. Rights can give people a small amount of
power in a few isolated instances, but this power is too fragmented and haphazard
to have a meaningful impact on protecting privacy. Ultimately, rights are at most
capable of being a supporting actor, a small component in a much larger
architecture.
I advance three reasons why rights are quite limited as an effective way to protect
privacy. First, many rights are not practical for individuals to exercise. Rights put
too much of the onus on individuals to fight a war that they cannot win. Attempting
to use privacy rights as a primary way to protect privacy is akin to arming an
individual with a dagger to fight an entire army. People cannot exercise their rights
in the kind of systematic way necessary to have a meaningful impact.
Second, privacy rights involve “privacy self-management,” a term I have used to
describe an approach to privacy that seeks to empower individuals to take control
of their personal data.9 Unfortunately, people lack the expertise to make
meaningful choices about their data. These choices involve weighing the costs and
benefits of allowing the collection, use, or transfer of their data. Although the
benefits are immediate and concrete, the costs involve risks that are more abstract
and speculative. Individuals lack the expertise to understand and assess the risks.
Even experts lack the knowledge about how the data will be used in the future and
how algorithms will reach decisions regarding the data.
Third, privacy cannot be protected at the level of the atomistic individual.
Individuals make privacy choices that have effects not just for themselves but for
many others. For example, sharing one’s genetic data also shares the genetic data
of one’s family members. In today’s world of machine learning, the personal data
of everyone in a data set has an impact on the decisions that the system makes.
To address these limitations with privacy rights, I contend that rights should not
be used as a primary means to regulate privacy. Privacy is about power.10 Rights
cannot empower individuals enough to equalize the power imbalance between
individuals and the organizations that collect and use their data. Effective privacy
protection involves not just facilitating individual control but also bringing the
collection, processing, and transfer of personal data under control. These two
SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 40 (1973).
9 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV 1879
(2013).
10 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information
Privacy, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, 1413-30 (2001) (describing different types of power involved with
privacy).
8
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forms of control – individuals having control and the data ecosystem being under
control – are very different, but they are often conflated in privacy policymaking.
Individual control is important, but it is only achievable in a limited way. The more
practical and effective aim is to bring the data ecosystem under better control.
Thus, to be effective, privacy laws must augment rights with broader measures that
are more societal and architectural in nature. For example, privacy rights grant
individuals the right to correct errors in their records. A more structural measure
involves ensuring that organizations carefully carry out their duty to maintain
accurate records. In contrast to rights, structural measures do not rely upon on
individuals as the engine of privacy protection.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the development of privacy rights.
Part II discusses the reasons why privacy rights are limited in the role they can play
in privacy protection. Part III analyzes each of the main types of privacy rights,
discusses the benefits and shortcomings of each, and sets forth the structural
measures that privacy laws should require.

I. THE RISE OF PRIVACY RIGHTS
Privacy rights have long been a central component of privacy regulation. In
contrast to Constitutional rights, privacy rights in statutes can apply to private or
public sector organizations depending upon the statutory scope. In many
instances, privacy rights are inalienable – people cannot agree to relinquish them,
but the rights must often be exercised or invoked.
Privacy rights in statutes began to emerge in the 1970s in legislation in the US and
Europe. For example, in 1970, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), was passed
in the US.11 The FCRA provided for several individual rights including right of
access and correction, among others.12
In 1973, a report by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
noted concerns about the increasing proliferation of digital record systems and
stressed the importance of ensuring that individuals have “a right to participate in
deciding what the content of the record will be, and what disclosure and use will
be made of the identifiable information in it.”13 The HEW report articulated one of
the earliest sets of Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) which proposed
individual rights to know about the data being collected and its intended use, to
correct errors in records, and to prevent new secondary uses of personal data.14
During the 1970s and 1980s, countless privacy laws were passed in the US and EU,
and nearly all of them contained rights, especially the rights to access and
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681b.
Id.
13 Id. at 40-41.
14 SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41–42 (1973). A year earlier, a similar report by the
Younger Committee in Great Britain, articulated a set of 10 principles, many of which were similar to
the HEW principles, although none of the Younger principles were cast in terms of providing rights
to individuals. See Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History - Version 2.20, at
5-6 (2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2415020. In 1980, the OECD Privacy Guidelines expanded
the FIPPs into eight principles. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., OECD Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980).
11
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correction.15
In the 1980s, many Latin American countries embraced a core set of privacy rights
in their constitutions known as the “writ of habeas data.”16 The writ’s name means
“you have the data.”17 Habeas data rights first appeared in 1988 in Brazil’s
constitution and soon spread to other countries, such as Colombia (1991),
Paraguay (1992), Peru (1995), Argentina (1994), and Ecuador (1996).18 Many Latin
American countries enacted comprehensive privacy laws starting in the late 1990s
and continuing on robustly through the early 21st century. Habeas data evolved
into a core group of privacy rights referred to as the “ARCO” rights, named for the
first letter of each.19 These rights include:
•

Right to Access. This right involves direct access to one’s records. It is often
combined with the right to information.

•

Right to Rectification. This right, also called the right to “correction,”
involves one’s ability to correct errors in one’s records.

•

Right to Cancellation. This right, also known as the right to “erasure” or
“deletion,” involves one’s ability to have data deleted from one’s records.

•

Right to Opposition. This right, also knowns as the right to “restriction” or
“object,” involves one’s ability to object to and stop the processing of
personal data. In the EU, the right to object and the right to restriction are
bifurcated into two separate rights.

In the US, most laws provided rights to information, access, and correction, but
not many other rights. Instead, many US laws provided individuals with rights to
opt out or opt in to the collection and use of their data.20
Back over in the EU, the Data Protection Directive of 1995 included the most robust
set of rights thus far in privacy laws:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Right to Information
Right to Access
Right to Rectification
Right to Restriction
Right to Erasure
Right to Object
Right to Not Be Subject to Automated Decisions21

For a timeline of the history of privacy law, including when major laws were passed, see DANIEL J.
SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 8-13 (2019).
16 Andrés Guadamuz, Habeas Data vs the European Data Protection Directive, 2001 J. Info. L. &
Tech. Issue 3 (2001); Sarah L. Lode, “You Have the Data"...The Writ of Habeas Data and Other Data
Protection Rights: Is the United States Falling Behind?, 94 Ind. L.J. Supplement 41 (2019).
17 Josiah Wolfson, The Expanding Scope of Human Rights in a Technological World - Using the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights to Establish a Minimum Data Protection Standard Across
Latin America, 48 U. Miami Inter-American L. Rev. 206 (2017).
18 Andrés Guadamuz, Habeas Data vs the European Data Protection Directive, 2001 J. Info. L. &
Tech. Issue 3 (2001).
19 Arturo J. Carrillo Follow the Leader? Comparative Law Study of the EU’s General Data Protection
Regulation’s Impact in Latin America, Minn. J. Int’l L. (forthcoming 2021).
20 See infra at _.
21 European Union Data Protection Directive, Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
15
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In 2014, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) issued a notable decision declaring
that individuals had a right to demand that search engines not report certain data
about them in searches.22 The CJEU derived this right from the right to erasure,
and this right has become known as the “right to be forgotten.”
In 2016, the EU enacted the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which
supersedes the Data Protection Directive.23 In Chapter 3, at Articles 12-22, the
GDPR provided all of the Directive’s rights and added a right to data portability.24
The full set of GDPR rights includes:
•

Right to Information. As set forth in Articles 13 and 14, this right involves a
right to obtain information about the types of personal data that are collected
about a person and how that data is processed.25

•

Right to Access. At Article 15, the GDPR provides individuals with a right to
have direct access to their records.26

•

Right to Rectification. The GPPR Article 16 provides a right to correct one’s
records as well as add information to an incomplete record.27

•

Right to Erasure. Article 17 of the GDPR provides a right to have data
removed from records under certain circumstances. This right also
encompasses the “right to be forgotten,” which is actually a different right, as
it does not involve the deletion of data but instead a right to obscurity.28

•

Right to Restriction. Article 18 of the GDPR enables an individual to demand
that organizations stop processing their data. This right often works in tandem
with the right to object in Article 21.29

•

Right to Data Portability. Article 20 provides for a right to data portability.
This right is a spinoff of the right to access, as it requires access to one’s
records in a commonly-used format. 30

•

Right to Object. Under Article 21 of the GDPR, individuals have a right to
object to the processing of their personal data. 31

•

Right to Not Be Subject to Automated Decisions. Article 22 of the GDPR
provides for transparency regarding automated decisionmaking and a right to
not be subject to a “decision based solely on automated processing, including

Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, in the European Court of Justice,
Case C-131/12, 2014 E.C.R. 317.
23 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation).
24 GDPR art. 12-22.
25 GDPR art. 13-14.
26 GDPR art. 15.
27 GDPR art. 16.
28 GDPR art. 17.
29 GDPR art. 18.
30 GDPR art. 20.
31 GDPR art. 21.
22
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profiling.” The right includes the ability to “obtain human intervention” and
to “contest the decision.”32
The slate of rights in the GDPR is the most comprehensive set of rights among
privacy laws worldwide. Only a few laws have all the rights in the GDPR. But many
laws passed after the GDPR are including more of the GDPR rights, and existing
laws are being amended to add additional GDPR rights.
In the US, the latest chapter in privacy regulation has been a burgeoning series of
broad privacy laws enacted by the states. The trend began in 2018 with the
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA). The CCPA contained rights to
information, deletion (erasure) and data portability. In 2020, the California
Privacy Right Act (CCPA), which amended the CCPA to add a right to correction
and a right to limit the use and disclosure of sensitive personal information (akin
to a right to restriction).
Other states have followed in California’s footsteps. Enacted in 2021, Virginia’s
Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA) provides rights to information, access,
correction, deletion, data portability, and opt out.33 Also enacted in 2021,
Colorado’s Privacy Rights Act provides a similar set of rights.34 These laws are
primarily rights-based approaches, as they rely heavily on individuals exercising
rights to learn about how their data is being collected and used and exercise rights
to opt out or delete their data. The laws have several other non-rights-based
provisions, many of which involve requirements to facilitate administering rights.
The clear center of gravity in these laws is providing rights for consumers to
exercise.
Early enforcement of the CCPA demonstrates that rights are the main focus. In a
press release describing enforcement efforts for the first year of CCPA
enforcement, the California Attorney General emphasized its focus on the
“groundbreaking rights” of the CCPA and “urged more Californians to take
advantage of their new rights.”35 The case examples provided in the press release
all focused on rights violations, such as failing to notify consumers of certain uses
of their data, failing to provide a notice when requiring consumers provide data to
participate in a loyalty program, failing to respond to individual requests in a
timely manner, and failing to have an opt out link on the company’s homepage.36
On a page listing examples of its enforcement actions, the California Attorney
General’s examples mostly include non-compliant privacy notices, failure to have
opt out links, and failure to respond to consumer rights requests.37 Except for a few
cases involving non-compliant service provider contracts, the vast bulk of the
enforcement involves making sure companies minister to individual rights.
Enforcement’s focus on rights is not surprising. Many violations come to the
attention of regulations by way of individual complaints, and rights violations are
GDPR art. 22.
Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, S.B. 1392 (2021).
34 Colorado Privacy Rights Act, Bill 6-1-1304.
35 Press Release, Attorney General Bonta Announces First-Year Enforcement Update on the
California Consumer Privacy Act, Launches New Online Tool for Consumers to Notify Businesses
of Potential Violations (July 19, 2021), https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-generalbonta-announces-first-year-enforcement-update-california.
36 Id.
37
Office of the California Attorney General, CCPA Enforcement Case Examples,
https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa/enforcement.
32
33
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the type of overt violation that is likely to be readily caught. Many of the other
privacy violations not involving the administration of rights occur in the shadows;
they are much harder to discover.

II. PROBLEMS AND SHORTCOMINGS
Privacy rights are a fundamental part of most privacy laws. Rights are laudable
because they can give people the ability to have a small amount of knowledge and
power. But rights cannot provide a more systematic protection of privacy for
individuals, let alone for society.
In this Part, I advance three arguments to support this contention. First, rights
present individuals with an endless burden of chores. People are provided with
something to do, so they feel as though they are in control. Unfortunately, this
control is often illusory. Rights are often difficult and time-consuming to invoke,
so they might be effective for occasional use, but not for contending with for the
hordes of companies that are processing people’s data.38 Privacy rights do not
scale.
Second, people are ill-equipped to engage in privacy self-management. Even if
people were able to free up hundreds of hours each year to use their rights with all
the organizations processing their data, people lack sufficient understanding about
the complexities of privacy to make meaningful decisions about the exercise of
their rights.39
Third, rights have too individualistic a focus to address the societal dimensions of
privacy. Individual privacy decisions affect not just themselves. Much personal
data is shared between people, not “owned” by just one individual. Personal data
is also interrelated; each person’s data affects inferences and decisions not just
about that person but about many other people.

A. AN ENDLESS BURDEN OF CHORES
On the surface, privacy laws that give people rights appear to empower people, but
in reality, these rights are just shiny tools that most people lack the time to use
frequently and the knowledge to use effectively.
Even worse than creating a mirage of control and empowerment, rights can lead to
the unfair blaming of individuals when they fail to exercise their rights. The onus
is placed on individuals to take action, and when individuals end up not doing so,
some commentators declare that this is evidence that people do not care about
privacy.40 Policymakers can pat themselves on the back and claim that they did
something to protect privacy, but they have merely armed people with a tiny dagger
to slay a vast army – a quest that is doomed to failure.
In many cases, an individual must exercise not just one right but several rights.
These multiple rights must be exercised with hundreds if not thousands of
organizations. Even when a person exercises rights with each organization, the
Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note _, at X.
Daniel J. Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2021); Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV 1879 (2013).
40 Solove, Privacy Paradox, supra note _, at X.
38
39
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data that these organizations gather and the uses of the data change over time. For
example, new information is constantly being added to a person’s credit report.
Thus, individuals must not just exercise rights once for each consumer reporting
agency, but also must do so on a routine basis, perhaps even daily. This would be
a challenging task if consumer reporting agencies were the only organizations that
gathered and used people’s data. But there are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
such organizations. Policing one’s records across all these organizations on a
frequent basis would be a tough job for a large team of full-time workers; there is
no plausible way for a lone individual to exercise all of the rights provided by
various privacy laws in a meaningful systematic way.
In the end, rights often fail to empower individuals. Instead, rights end up as mere
chores that are unpaid, tedious, and time-consuming. Rights are impossible to
exercise in the kind of systematic way that will actually control the way that
people’s data is collected, processed, and transferred.

B. PROBLEMS WITH PRIVACY SELF-MANAGEMENT
The overarching goals of rights are to empower individuals to control their data.
To be truly empowered, people should be able to make appropriate cost-benefit
risk decisions about the collection, use, or transfer of their data. On the surface,
privacy rights appear to be empowering. Rights are thus a go-to for many privacy
laws. But rights fail because people just do not know enough and cannot know
enough to make good cost-benefit decisions about their data.41
With many privacy decisions, the benefits are immediate and concrete. People can
receive access to entertainment, news, and information. They can obtain great
services and products. They can use convenient and useful technologies. On the
privacy side is a risk that is often vague, abstract, and speculative.
Even without the scaling problems, rights are doomed to fail. People cannot use
rights in a meaningful way even if they had adequate time and attention to devote
to exercising their rights. Rights often give people only perfunctory control, not
meaningful control. People receive information, notices, and a few limited choices
such as to opt out or object. But they often are rather powerless to do much about
the judgments being made about them based on their data.42
Compounding these difficulties is the fact that the implications of allowing the
collection, use, or dissemination of various pieces of data constantly changes and
evolves. With each additional piece of data, the privacy risks change. More data
revealed can lead to more data combined, which can give rise to inferences that
generate secondary data about people.43 New uses change the risk.
Even the same piece of data evolves in its risks. For example, today’s photo is more
revealing than yesterday’s photo. A photo in the past would just reveal what was
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV 1879
(2013).
42 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2007). This problem
is exacerbated by the use of artificial intelligence, which often results in decisions made without due
process or being heard. Evelyn Douek, Facebook’s “Oversight Board:” Move Fast with Stable
Infrastructure and Humility, 21 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 1, 13 (2019).
43 Alicia Solow-Niederman, Information Privacy and the Inference Economy (Aug. 5, 2021) (draft
on file with author).
41
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captured in the photo. Today, a photo includes extensive metadata about
geolocation, time, and other things. The ability to identify people, items, and places
in the photo is vastly enhanced. The privacy risks of sharing a photo are entirely
different from the quaint old days when a photo was just a photo, not a treasure
trove of data. People are often unaware of how much data they are sharing when
they share a photo. More broadly, people do not realize the full story of what is
going on with their data, and without this understanding, people cannot effectively
use their rights to gain control of their data.
Photos are just the tip of the iceberg. Data begets data; it multiples like mice. The
documentary Don’t F**k with Cats illustrates how much more one can learn from
data today than before.44 A disgruntled man posted online videos of his killing of
kittens. A group of outraged people who saw the video attempted to identify the
killer. The amateur sleuths were able to analyze various items and other things in
the video to figure out more information about the killer. As they narrowed in on
the killer, they were able to find photographs of him, from which they were
eventually able to identify where he lived from the background of the photos and
using Google Maps. They were able to coordinate and share information via the
Internet. Digital technologies enabled them to figure out a lot more than they
would have been able to figure out circa 1980 or 1990 or even 2000. The
documentary shows how small pieces of data can be combined and analyzed to
reveal a lot more information. Technology is amplifying this process.
People are not data scientists. They have trouble understanding the implications
of their personal data at face value, let alone the downstream uses and secondary
data that can be generated. Rights can help put people in a cockpit with a lot of
buttons, levers, settings, toggles, and choices, but if people do not know how to fly
the plane, these controls are meaningless.

C. THE SOCIETAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY
Another limitation of privacy rights is that they depend upon the actions of
atomistic individuals. Protecting privacy cannot be accomplished solely on an
individualized level, as there are societal implications for many decisions that
people make regarding personal data.
There are several distinct yet related points involved with the societal dimension
of privacy: (1) individual privacy has a social value because protecting it
contributes to societal goals; (2) personal data is often shared between people
rather than owned exclusively by one individual; and (3) with artificial intelligence,
machine learning, and algorithmic decisionmaking, personal data is interrelated,
making an individual’s privacy decisions affect other people beyond the individual
alone. All of these points lead to the conclusion that privacy cannot be regulated
primarily by giving individuals greater control.
1. The Social Value of Privacy
Scholars have long pointed out that protecting individual privacy is not just for the
sake of the individual but because of the larger social value of protecting individual
privacy. Indeed, this claim can be made more generally about all individual rights.
As John Dewey argued, rights are not only justified by their importance to
44
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individuals but by “the contribution they make to the welfare of the community.”45
Robert Post persuasively contends that privacy “safeguards the rule of civility that
in some significant measure constitute both individuals and community,”46 Spiros
Simitis argues that “privacy considerations no longer arise out of particular
individual problems; rather, they express conflicts affecting everyone.”47
Scholars, including myself, have pointed out that privacy is a social value.48 Paul
Schwartz contends that privacy is essential for democracy.49 As Ruth Gavison
writes, “Privacy is also essential to democratic government because it fosters and
encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a
democracy.”50 Julie Cohen also views privacy as a “constitutive element of a civil
society.”51 Neil Richards elaborates that privacy protects intellectual activities that
undergird the freedom of thinking, exploration of ideas, and speech, which are
essential components of a free society.52
Protecting individual rights has typically been the main way of protecting
individual freedom, so it is not surprising that privacy law seeks to protect privacy
with privacy rights. Rights are often understood as rights against the government,
such as Constitutional rights in the US, but there is also a broader tradition of
positive rights that understands rights as involving government obligations to
protect against incursions by private parties. For example, in the EU, there is a
duty of member nations to protect privacy rights against infringements not just by
the government but by others.53 In the US, the common law tradition has long
viewed tort protections against others as “rights,” and it is no accident that the
famous 1890 article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis was called The Right
to Privacy.54
Protecting individual privacy has a value for society, and society need not protect
individual privacy solely by giving individuals rights that they can choose to invoke.
Certainly, providing people with rights can help in promoting privacy’s social value
if people’s exercise of their rights leads them to have the kind of robust privacy
necessary for the larger ends of society. However, people struggle to exercise their
rights. People often are coerced or manipulated into consenting to various uses of
their data.55
45 JOHN DEWEY, Liberalism and Civil Liberties (1936), in 11 LATER WORKS 374 (Jo Ann Boydston
46 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common

ed. 1991).
Law Tort,

77 Calif. L. Rev. 957, 959 (1989).
47 Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707, 709 (1987). In
analyzing the problems of federal legislative policymaking on privacy, Priscilla Regan demonstrates
the need for understanding privacy in terms of its social benefits. See Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating
Privacy (1995).
48 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).
49 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L Rev. 1609, 1613 (1999).
50 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421, 455 (1980).
51 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
1373, 1428 (2000).
52 NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(2015); NEIL M. RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS (2021).
53 Vladislava Stoyanova, The Disjunctive Structure of Positive Rights Under the European
Convention on Human Rights, 87 Nordic J. of Int’l L. 344 (2018) (“There is little doubt that the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) imposes positive obligations upon states to ensure
the rights enshrined therein.”).
54 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harvard Law Review 193 (1890).
55 Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 995, 999 (2014) (noting how
companies exploit “irrationality or vulnerability in consumers”); Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable
Manipulation, 34 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 449, 469 (2019); Tal Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the
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Additionally, privacy issues extend beyond threats to individual privacy. There are
larger societal problems caused or worsened by certain uses of personal data, such
as discrimination as well as subordination of minority groups and the poor.56 As
Ari Waldman notes, “Individual rights will not solve collective privacy
problems.”57
Privacy rights work differently than many constitutional or statutory rights. For
example, when a person challenges a law based on the right to free speech under
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the judicial decision has effects that
go far beyond the person’s case. The law might be partially or fully invalidated. The
person’s challenge thus leads to a result that has broader societal effects. In
contrast, exercising a privacy right often merely affects that individual. For
example, if an individual gains access to her records or deletes data from her
records, this has no larger societal impact. More generally, privacy rights
contribute only in a minor way to the larger societal interests involved with privacy.
Their effects are far more individualistic than Constitutional rights.
2. Shared Personal Data
Personal data is often shared between people. This fact is often underappreciated.
The language of property is often invoked regarding personal data. People are said
to “own” their data.58 For many reasons, property is a poor fit for conceptualizing
privacy.
Many types of personal data do not merely involve the isolated individual. For
example, a photo of a person at a party with others does not just involve the
personal data of that person but also of all the other people in the photo. Genetic
information is shared among family members. Uploading one’s contacts to a social
media site implicates the privacy of each of the contacts.
Even a transaction, such as buying a book, involves shared data. Suppose I sell
copies of one of my books on eBay. A celebrity buys my book. When I see the name
and address of the celebrity, I become giddy with excitement. I post about it on
social media. Meanwhile, the celebrity is irked because I am posting about a book
the celebrity bought. Whom does this fact belong to? For me, it is an important
moment in my life. I want to share my life story with the world, and the celebrity’s
identity is part of that story. But the data is also about the celebrity’s life too. It is
shared data. We both have a claim to it.
Companies that sell products and services to people can make the same claim.
Information about a transaction is also information about their own activities for
Digital Age, 20 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 157, 174 (2019) (“[m]anipulative practices impair the
process of choosing, subjecting it to the preferences and influences of a third party, as opposed to
those of the individuals themselves.”).
56 Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Practice, and Performance, 110 Cal. L. Rev. _, 36 (2021); Solon
Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 671 (2016); VIRGINIA
EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR
(2018).
57 Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Practice, and Performance, 110 Cal. L. Rev. _, manuscript p. 35
(2021).
58 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999); but see Pamela Samuelson,
Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1125, 1137-47 (2000) (critiquing arguments for
treating personal data as property); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 (2001).
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their own records.
As Simeon de Brouwer observes, there are “privacy externalities” because people’s
decisions to allow the collection and use of their personal data can also reveal data
about other people.59 For example, a person’s autobiography will invariably involve
personal information about other people: parents, siblings, children, spouses,
partners, colleagues, friends, enemies, neighbors, and others. It is often
impossible to tell one’s story without referring to the personal data of other people.
Much of our personal data is shared because much of life involves relationships
and transactions between people.
Privacy rights are exercised by separate individuals to tend to their data. Such
rights of lone individuals cannot extend to shared data without violating the
privacy of others. This leaves shared data in a no man’s land
3. Interrelated Personal Data
Rights also are limited when people’s privacy decisions involve interrelated data.
Interrelated data is somewhat different than shared data. Shared data involves
facts that are directly connected between two or more people – such as genetic
data. Interrelated data involves data that is not necessarily shared but that affects
inferences made about others.
In today’s “inference economy,” machine learning and other forms of algorithmic
decisionmaking work by making inferences based on data sets.60 Everyone’s data
in the data set is used to make inferences, which are often then used to make
decisions affecting people. As Salomé Viljoen notes, “Data flows are designed to
represent the ways that people are like one another and reveal meaningful things
about one another; how we are alike biologically, interpersonally, politically, and
economically.”61 Viljoen observes that “data’s relationality is central to the business
of data production and constitutes much of what makes data production
economically valuable to begin with.”62
Many algorithms involve finding patterns in aggregations of data about millions of
people. Rights are limited to the individual, so access, knowledge, algorithmic
transparency, and other rights lack much meaning with just one particular
individual’s data isolated. The lone individual merely seeking information about
decisions affecting her and how her particular data is being used will never learn
the whole story. To truly understand how these algorithms reach decisions, one
must examine the data of everyone fed into the algorithm.
The game Clue demonstrates the interrelatedness of personal data and how
inferences about a person can be made based on other people’s data. This murder
mystery game involves the random selection of a murderer, a murder weapon, and
a room where the crime occurred. The characters are Mr. Green, Mrs. White, Miss
Scarlet, Colonel Mustard, Professor Plum, and Mrs. Peacock. The murder weapons
Simeon de Brouwer, Privacy Self-Management and the Issue of Privacy Externalities: Of
Thwarted Expectations, and Harmful Exploitation, Internet Policy Review, Vo. 9, No. 4 (Dec. 21,
2020).
60 Alicia Solow-Niederman, Information Privacy and the Inference Economy (Aug. 5, 2021) (draft
on file with author).
61 Salomé Viljoen, Democratic Data: A Relational Theory for Data Governance, 131 Yale L.J. _
(2021), manuscript at 28.
62 Id. at 30.
59
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include a rope, candlestick, knife, gun, wrench, and lead pipe. Thera are various
rooms in the house.
Cards for each are stuffed into an envelope that is set aside. Players are dealt cards
for the other people, weapons, and rooms. Players know that the characters,
rooms, and weapons in their hand are innocent, but they do not know what is in
the other players’ hands. As the game progresses, players learn about various cards
in each other’s hands, and are thus able to use the process of elimination to figure
out who did it, with what weapon, and in which room.
Suppose the killer is Colonel Mustard in the library with the knife. With each piece
of data revealed, such as the fact that Mr. Green or Professor Plum are not the
culprit, one learns more about Colonel Mustard. Eventually, through process of
elimination, a player can know for certain that the killer is Colonel Mustard.
Clue is an apt demonstration that much personal data is not only relational
because it involves multiple people in some sort of relationship, but also because
information about people can be used to make inferences about other people.
Information about Professor Plum can affect inferences made about Colonel
Mustard even if neither Plum nor Mustard share the same pieces of data.
Shifting from the game to real life, the exercise of individual rights has effects in
the data ecosystem, as it can affect inferences. Each person might have a miniscule
effect, but collectively these effects could be notable. Individuals exercising rights
or failing to do so does not just affect themselves.
Returning to the Clue example, suppose that Company Z maintains records about
all of the Clue characters. Company Z learns that Colonel Mustard is guilty, so it
changes the designation in his record from “suspect” to “guilty.” With Colonel
Mustard’s data indicating that he is the culprit, Company Z can infer that the other
characters are innocent. Company Z therefore changes the records of the other
characters from indicating that they are suspects to indicating that they are
innocent. Colonel Mustard is outraged that he is identified as the culprit and
demands that this data be deleted. But if the records of the other characters state
that they are innocent, we will still know by inference that Colonel Mustard is the
culprit even though he deleted this data.
Adding another twist, if Colonel Mustard exercises a right to delete his data, then
a dilemma arises about how to handle the records of the other characters. As the
records of the other characters indicate that they are innocent, their collected data
will still result in the inference that Colonel Mustard is the culprit. To truly protect
Colonel Mustard, the inferences made based on the deleted data must also be
removed from the other characters’ records. If the information about innocence is
also deleted from the records of the other characters, then this turns each of them
back into a suspect. As a result, these characters would likely be quite unhappy
when Colonel Mustard’s data is deleted. They would claim that their records went
from accurately stating that they were innocent to now incorrectly stating that they
are still suspected of the murder. They might claim that their rights are violated by
the change.
In sum, because a person’s data might be the piece in a puzzle that also enables
inferences to be made about others, that person’s exercise of rights can affect other
people – and vice versa.
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4. The Inadequacy of Individual Control
Exercising rights is akin to trying to empty the ocean with one cup at a time. The
gigantic machinery of what Shoshana Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism” is
barely affected by the miniscule number of people who occasionally exercise one
of their privacy rights.63
Of course, rights are an important component of privacy regulation. Rights can be
useful to individuals for occasional situations, and they should certainly be part of
privacy laws. Rights can force companies to spend more time and resources dealing
with privacy. Administering rights, such as responding to data subject access
requests, requires an understanding of the personal data being collected and
processed. In this way, rights can improve organizational privacy practices. But
most privacy laws rely far too heavily on rights. The result is that so many laws
create the illusion that they are protecting privacy through rights when they are
not.
Individuals are often powerless and vulnerable in a world where their vast
quantities of their personal data is collected and used in ways that affect their lives.
It thus seems intuitive to try to give individuals more control over their personal
data with privacy rights. Ultimately, however, individuals can never be fully in
control. To be effective, control cannot just be placed in the hands of individuals;
control must come from society.

III. PRIVACY RIGHTS
AND SOCIETAL MEASURES
In this Part, I analyze specific common privacy rights, and I discuss their strengths
and shortcomings. As the GDPR rights are the most comprehensive and standard
set of rights, I use these rights as the basic framework. However, there are other
rights that are not quite identical to the GDPR rights but that are related. I discuss
each in connection with its closest relative.
I discuss the failure of each right both facially and in practice. A right fails facially
if it does not address key problems, is not suited to achieving relevant goals, or is
structurally doomed and inherently unworkable. The goals behind many rights are
often lost, and it is not clear that policymakers really understand and consider the
goals when including rights in laws. In practice, many rights are implemented in a
hollow and meaningless way. People rarely exercise rights and are often stymied
when they do.
In evaluating each right, it is important to focus on their goals. I discuss various
goals that the rights explicitly aim to achieve as well as normatively what the goals
should be. After discussing the shortcomings of each right, I then recommend the
types of societal measures that would achieve these goals in a more structural and
effective way.

63
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A. RIGHT TO INFORMATION OR NOTICE
The right to information is a right of data subjects to know about the existence of
record systems involving their personal data and to know about the types of data
an organization gathers about data subjects and about how it is processed. Called
the “right to information” under the GDPR and many other privacy laws around
the world, this right is also referred to as a “right to notice” or “right to know” in
the US.64
The right to information is an important part of privacy protection. Most privacy
laws provide for this right. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a privacy law lacking in at
least some dimensions of this right. The right often requires disclosing information
about the data gathered about people; how the data is used, transferred, and
protected; and data subject rights. Information is provided on one or both of the
following ways – through a general notice posted to a website or sent to data
subjects or in response to a request by a data subject.
Some laws require that the notice be provided directly to people, such as the US
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which requires financial institutions to deliver a printed
privacy notice annually (unless people opt to receive it electronically).65 In most
laws, notice can be via a statement posted on a website. For example, the GDPR
provides data subjects with a right to be informed about their personal data that
entities hold, how it will be used, and to whom it will be transferred.66 The notice
also must inform data subjects about their rights regarding their data. According
to Recital 58, this information can be posted on a public website in the form of a
privacy notice.67
The amount of information in the notice varies from law to law. Some laws provide
specific elements that must be included in a notice. For example, the California
Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA) requires a list of categories of personal
data collected, categories of third parties with whom personal data is shared, and
other information.68 The GDPR requires that the privacy notice identify the
controller, the data protection officer, the purposes for collecting the data, the
categories of recipients, the period of storage of the data, whether there will be
automated processing, and information about a data subject’s rights.69
The privacy practices for data gathered through a website are frequently different
from the privacy practices for data gathered within a relationship with a data
subject or for data gathered from other sources. Some organizations might have
different notices for their website data versus their account or relationship data.
This bifurcation will might confuse people, but it is ironically a more accurate
description of how the data will be processed.
Another dimension of notice provisions in privacy laws is regulation about how
conspicuous the notice must be. Under the GLBA, notice must be “clear and

California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) (right to know); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (privacy
notices); HIPAA (notice of privacy practices).
65 FDIC, Privacy of Consumer Financial Information §332.9.
66 GDPR art 13-14.
67 GDPR Recital 58.
68 The Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575-22579 (2004).
69 GDPR art. 13-14.
64
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conspicuous.”70 The CalOPPA requires that a privacy notice be posted
conspicuously on an organization’s website.71 The CCPA goes a step further by
mandating a conspicuous button for people to opt out of selling or sharing personal
data.72
The CCPA’s right to “know” provides individuals with a right to request the specific
pieces of personal data that organizations have collected about them.73 This part of
the CCPA’s right to know is similar to a right to access and will be discussed later
on.
On the surface, the right to information aims to provide information about privacy
practices to individuals. It is uncontroversial to contend that individuals should
have a right to know. The right to information should exist no matter what reasons
people want to know, even if out of mere curiosity. But as a component of a regime
of privacy protection, the right to information should achieve to something more.
Framed in a broader more structural way, there are at least two important goals
that could be achieved in connection with providing individuals with information:
(1) informing individuals so they can make wise decisions; and (2) promoting
accountability internally in organizations and externally to experts and regulators.
1. Informed Decisions
Merely providing information to people is a formalistic exercise that achieves very
little. A more meaningful goal for effective privacy protection should be to inform
people. There is an enormous difference between providing people with
information and actually informing people so that they can make informed
decisions. Indeed, it is hard to view privacy law as successful if it merely provides
information to people but fails to result in any improvements in their decisions.
Several problems, however, make the right to information fail to inform people.
The right looks far more meaningful and protective than it is in practice. One set
of problems involves difficulties in people’s ability to make full use of the right. In
most laws, the right to information requires data subjects to make a specific
request for information or to locate and read a privacy notice. But people lack
knowledge of the legions of companies that gather enormous quantities of personal
data about them from a panoply of sources. Having a privacy notice posted on a
website is not enough to alert people to the fact. To have an accurate picture of the
entities that have a data subject’s personal data, the data subject must be directly
informed about these entities. People cannot exercise the right to information in a
meaningful way if they lack knowledge that particular organizations have their
data.
In practice, rights to information are used only by a small number of people. Even
when people seek the information, doing so once is insufficient. Many
organizations are constantly gathering more and more information and are
repeatedly changing their privacy notices. Thus, for each organization, people must
repeatedly exercise their right to information.

17 CFR § 248.4.
The Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575-22579 (2004).
72 CCPA, 1798.185.
73 CCPA, 1798.100(a).
70
71
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Reading privacy notices is a task that does not scale.74 There are simply too many
privacy notices to read – people get notice fatigue. According to a study by Aleecia
McDonald and Lorrie Cranor, if people were to read all relevant privacy notices, it
would take more than 200 hours a year.75 It is simply not practical – or fully
rational – to read each privacy notice carefully.
Privacy notices are notoriously complex. They are often written in turgid lifeless
prose that is at a very high reading level.76 Moreover, most privacy notices are
finely pureed by lawyers and then whipped into a batter with no discernible flavor.
They have as much substance as a Twinkie has nutrition.
Even if all people were to suddenly start reading privacy notices, people often lack
the ability to understand the information they receive about their data and are not
in a good position to make thoughtful cost-benefit decisions.77
Several privacy laws valiantly try to address some of these problems. Some laws
require that privacy notices be written in ways that people can understand. For
example, Virginia’s CDPA requires that privacy notices be "reasonably accessible,
clear, and meaningful."78 The GDPR requires that privacy notices be “concise,
easily accessible and easy to understand” and written in “clear and plain
language.”79
Despite these ideals, many privacy notices are more complicated than James
Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake. In defense of privacy notice authors, privacy is quite
complex, so describing it plainly and concisely yet accurately is not an easy task. In
fact, it can be an almost impossible task because privacy is too complicated to be
dumbed down to something pithy and clear.
Most organizations post a link to their privacy notices on the footer of their main
page – and often on the site’s general footer for all pages. The problem, though, is
that most people do not read privacy notices.80 Privacy laws often do little to
address this problem except to require that a privacy notice be conspicuous. The
failure of many people to read privacy notices, however, is likely not due to a lack
of conspicuousness. No matter how conspicuous a privacy notice is, most people
probably will not read it.
Even in the rare cases where people want to read privacy notices, they are timeconsuming to review, difficult to understand, and not presented to people at
relevant times or at the moment when they are interested in engaging.
Some commentators propose making privacy notices like nutrition labels or

Solove, Privacy Self-Management, supra note X, at _.
Aleecia M. McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S, A
Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 540, 565 (2008).
76 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 Harv. L. Rev 1879
(2013).
77 Id. at _.
78 Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act, S.B. 1392 § 59.1-574(C).
79 GDPR Recital 58.
80 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 647, 665–78 (2011); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating
the Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
165, 178 (2011) (noting that people read contract boilerplate terms less than 1% of the time).
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making notices more visceral.81 Attempts to make notice simpler create the risk of
oversimplifying. Privacy is quite complex and often cannot be understood as
simply as the amount of fat and sodium on a nutrition label.
Another improvement might be to provide direct notice to data subjects – without
their even having to ask for it. Direct notice would be impractical in many
circumstances. Data controllers may have a lot of data about a person but not any
contact information about the person. Another difficulty is that with so many
entities having personal data about people, direct notice would unleash a tsunami
of individual notices. Flooding people with these notices might become a nuisance,
and it is unlikely that people would read the notices.
There are ways to improve the way that individuals are informed, though there are
no silver bullets. To address the problem of too many notices to read, the law
should set forth standard privacy terms that people could rely upon as the default.
Deviations from these standard default terms would be prominently displayed to
consumers. It is far easier to review important divergences from the norm than to
read through thousands of privacy notices. The move to standard terms and calling
out deviations would ease the burden on individuals significantly.
To address the problems of inattentiveness and notice fatigue, privacy laws could
impose heightened notice requirements when there are greater risks of harm to
data subjects.82 Heightened notice would be more prominent than ordinary notice,
and its timing would be more relevant to when data subjects would make key
decisions or when risks would likely materialize.83
Heightened notice will certainly help address notice fatigue by bringing to people’s
attention the outlier activities and ones that are potentially harmful so people can
focus their attention on the important things.
But even heightened notice is not enough. It can alert people to higher risks, but
people still lack the tools they need to make the appropriate cost-benefit analysis
for their decisions regarding their data. In the U.S. especially, privacy law relies far
too heavily on the notice-and-choice approach, which involves providing people
with notice and then relying on them to make decisions about their privacy based
on the notice. Often, laws deem people’s inaction (such as not opting out) as a form
of consent or acquiescence in the practices stated in the notice, even when most
people do not read the notice.
With the notice-and-choice approach, the right to information is twisted into
serving a pernicious purpose – to legitimize nearly any form of data collection and
use through an implausible fiction of consent. If improved notice merely serves as
additional shine to the veneer of the notice-and-choice approach, then improved
notice ultimately might amount to better signage along the road to hell.
Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with the right to information. The
Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism In Privacy (And Elsewhere), 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1027
(2012); Melanie Weir, What are Apple's Privacy Nutrition Labels?, Business Insider (Jan 20, 2021).
82 In the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of the Law, Data Privacy, Paul Scwartz and I as
reporters on the project proposed “heightened notice” that would be required for “any data activity
that is significantly unexpected or that poses a significant risk of causing material harm to a data
subject.” ALI, Principles of the Law, Data Privacy § 4(e)(1).
83 See ALI, Principles of the Law, Data Privacy § 4(e)(6) (“Heightened notice shall be made more
prominently than ordinary notice and closer in time to the particular data activity.”).
81
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right is unobjectionable and is an essential component of most privacy laws.
However, to be meaningful, the right to information must be part of a larger effort
to ensure that people make informed decisions about their privacy. And, where this
effort is not achievable, there must be other ways to protect privacy that do not
turn on individual decisions.
No matter how much the right to information is improved, another fundamental
problem is not endemic to the right itself. A major problem is the way that many
privacy laws rely too much on the right to information. The problem is that the
right is asked to do far too much work. Privacy laws try to leverage the right to
information as a large part of the solution to privacy problems. The right to
information is a useful go-to for policymakers because more transparency is often
uncontroversial. The idea is that as long as organizations are transparent about
what they are doing, as long as individuals have the ability to know, then it is okay
for organizations to have the ability to do nearly anything they want.
Transparency is seen as the cure-all. Organizations can essentially build their own
sandbox with boundaries as far out as they desire, marking out a vast desert within
which to play. They can write the rules within the sandbox, so nearly anything can
be permitted. Transparency is not enough. If the sandbox is too large and too
tolerant of harmful activities, merely telling people it is dangerous is not enough
given people’s limitations in making good cost-benefit decisions regarding their
privacy.
The law should establish boundaries for data collection and use. These boundaries
need not be overly narrow; the sandbox for permissible collection and use can be
large. The law should set norms so that people have a basic set of expectations
about the use of their data without having to read through thousands of privacy
notices.
2. Accountability
Informing people should not be the only goal related to the right to information.
Notice also serves as an accountability mechanism internally as well as for experts
and regulators to understand the data processing activities of organizations.
Internally, privacy policies help companies think about their privacy practices.
Peter Swire points to a practical benefit of notices as leading to organizations to
“inspect their own practices.”84 When organizations administer the right to
information, they must be more aware of the data they collect, store, and use.
Organizations must articulate their policies, which can make them use personal
data in less of an ad hoc manner. Of course, not all organizations use this
opportunity to get their house in order, but many do, Thus, internally, the right to
information pushes organizations toward better data hygiene.
Beyond internal accountability, privacy notices create external accountability.
Organizations must publicly state their privacy practices, which can be evaluated
by experts, advocates, and regulators. If organizations fail to adhere to their stated
practices, regulators can hold them accountable. In the US, for example, the FTC
considers breaking promises in privacy notices as a “deceptive” trade practice
Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1263,
1316 (2002). But see WALDMAN, INDUSTRY UNBOUND, supra note __ at __ (critiquing internal
compliance and accountability programs as ineffective).
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under Section 5 of the FTC Act.85
For the goal of accountability, more detail and complexity in a privacy notice is
required than the vague vapid claims in many privacy notices. There is thus a
dilemma at the heart of notice: The simpler and shorter privacy notices are written,
the less meaningful detail they will often contain. Short and simple privacy notices
do not provide enough information to help people have a good understanding of
how their data will be processed. Making choices about privacy is quite
complicated, so people must be provided with a lot of information to assess the
risks and consequences of sharing their data or consenting to uses.
To address problems of conflicting goals of privacy notices, one solution might be
to cleave the notice into two separate documents – a transparency statement with
details and a more simple notice for data subjects.86 The simple summary could
help consumers get a very abbreviated sense of what a company is doing with
privacy, and the detail could be referred to if people are interested in a deeper dive.
The detailed document would be for the company's own internal accountability as
well as for regulators to ensure that the company is following its practices. Of
course, to be effective, regulators would have to enforce vigorously against
companies that violated their promises. And, as discussed above, there must be
substantive restrictions on inadequate or otherwise problematic privacy practices.

B. RIGHT TO ACCESS
The right to access provides individuals with a way to access their personal data
that entities maintain. The right exists in most privacy laws.87 For example, under
the GDPR, data subjects have the right to access their personal data.88 The U.S.
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) provides individuals with the right to access their
files.89 HIPAA’s right of access allows patients to obtain a copy of their medical
records in the format they request.90 Countless other privacy laws provide
individuals with a right to access their data. For example, access is a core
component of many Latin American privacy laws, as it is a key part of the
foundational right to habeas data.91
To some extent, the right to access can overlap the right to information, though
Solove & Hartzog, FTC Common Law, supra note _, at CITE.
ALI, Principles of the Law, Data Privacy §§3- 4.
87 Laws diverge on the time that organizations have to provide access. Many laws provide 30 days.
One of the shortest time periods is Uruguay’s right to access, which requires a response in just five
days. Uruguay Law No. 18.331 on the Protection of Personal Data and Habeas Data Action. See Data
Guidance,
Uruguay
–
Data
Protection
Overview
(Mar.
2021),
https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/uruguay-data-protection-overview/.
88 GDPR art. 15.
89 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(g)(a)(1) (“Every consumer reporting agency shall, upon
request, and subject to section 1681h(a)(1) of this title, clearly and accurately disclose to the
consumer: (1) All information in the consumer’s file at the time of the request . . . .”).
90 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (2019) (“[A]n individual has a right of access to inspect and obtain a copy
of protected health information about the individual in a designated record set.”); id.§
164.524(c)(2)(i) (“The covered entity must provide the individual with access to the protected health
information in the form and format requested by the individual, if it is readily producible in such
form and format; or, if not, in a readable hard copy form or such other form and format as agreed to
by the covered entity and the individual.”)., for as long as the protected health information is
maintained in the designated record set, except for: (i) Psychotherapy notes; and (ii) Information
compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or for use in, a civil, criminal, or administrative action or
proceeding.”).
91 Guadamuz, Habeas Data vs the European Data Protection Directive, supra note X, at __.
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these rights are distinct. The right to access involves direct access to one’s personal
data, which some versions of the right to information also provide. For example,
under the CCPA, the right to information encompasses the specific pieces of
personal information that businesses maintain.92 The right to information diverges
when it requires information about purposes of use or data subject rights. In other
laws, the right to information diverges when it does not involve access to actual
personal data but instead provides information about categories of personal data
collected or maintained. The distinction between the rights is that the right to
access involves specific data and the right to information involves information
about data collection and processing activities as well as rights.
Evaluating access rights depends upon the goals of providing access. There are
several different goals, which depend upon the type of records involved: (1)
learning about the specific personal data that organizations collect and process; (2)
reviewing the data to make sure that it is accurate and complete; or (3) using the
data for one’s own aims and purposes.
1. Learning About Personal Data
The first goal involves learning about the specific personal data that organizations
collect and process. This broad goal is the closest to the right to information. People
might be curious about the specific pieces of personal data an organization
maintains.
Access rights for learning goals, however, are often not very meaningful. For
example, the CCPA gives individuals the right to see the specific data that
organizations have collected.93 This data often comes in the form of a data dump
of all the personal data an organization has about a person.94 Although people
might learn that a lot more data is gathered about them than they had realized,
they will often not learn much else. What matters more for understanding the
privacy implications is how that data will be used. What types of analysis will be
performed on the data? What conclusions will be drawn from the data? What
decisions will be made based on those conclusions? These are key questions people
must know to assess the consequences of consenting to an organization’s
processing of their data.
Additionally, there is also a scaling problem. Making access requests for the
hundreds (and often thousands) of organizations that have data about a person
will be a tremendous chore. Receiving data dumps from all of these organizations
will be quite unwieldy. To achieve this goal, people must really be educated about
how to make cost-benefit decisions about their data. As I have argued at length
elsewhere, this is tremendously difficult for people to do.95 The right to access
cannot achieve this broader goal. Although ultimately, people will never be
sufficiently educated and will never be able to make wise cost-benefit decisions
about their data, the effort to try to educate them and help them is a worthy one
and worth pursuing even in the face of failure. Moving the needle a little bit is still
worthwhile.
CCPA, 1798.100(a).
CCPA, 1798.100(a).
94 Kashmir Hill, “I Got Access to My Secret Consumer Score. Now You Can Get Yours, Too,” N.Y.
Times (Nov. 4, 2019) (“[M]ost of these companies are just showing you the data they used to make
decisions about you, not how they analyzed that data or what their decision was.”).
95 Solove, Self-Management, supra note X, at _.
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However, teaching people to a limited degree and improving their decisions in a
small way are far from adequate to addressing the problem that personal data is
being used to affect people’s lives in ways that are not always in their best interest.
To address this problem, the law must do more to regulate data uses, algorithms,
and inferences.
2. Reviewing Personal Data
Another goal of access is reviewing the personal data to make sure that it is
accurate and complete. This goal matters most when there are potential negative
consequences if the data has errors. For example, reviewing credit reports helps
individuals protect themselves against errors or incomplete data, which could lead
to negative consequences such as denial of loans, loss of job opportunities, or
higher interest rates. This goal works in tandem with the right to rectification (or
correction), where individuals have a right to correct errors or add data to their
records to make them complete.
Access rights, however, fall short of achieving this goal in several ways. Access does
not scale well, and it will be too great a burden for individuals to access and review
all important records. The onus should not be on individuals to continually act as
unpaid proofreaders of their records.
Additionally, people lack knowledge of the existence of many entities that maintain
records about them. Many people even do not know that consumer reporting
agencies have their data and cannot name any of the big three agencies. There are
countless other entities that maintain records that have substantial effects on
people’s lives. For example, the Medical Information Bureau (MIB) maintains
records used by health and life insurance companies to “assess an individual's risk
and eligibility during the underwriting of life, health, disability income, critical
illness, and long-term care insurance policies.”96 People can make a request to see
their MIB file. But many people have no idea that the MIB exists, let alone that they
can access their file or how to access their file. This problem exists with many
entities. People cannot use access rights if they do not know the entities from which
to seek access.
The goal of reviewing personal data should be achieved through stronger duties on
organizations to ensure that data is accurate and complete. Despite many statutory
principles and duties to maintain accurate records, these provisions in laws are
mainly enforced by the right to rectification or correction. There must be
enforcement mechanisms to ensure accuracy that does not place the burden on
individuals. For example, external accuracy audits could be required for certain
industries such as credit reporting or healthcare. I will discuss such audits later on
with the discussion of the right to rectification.
3. Using Personal Data
A third goal for the right to access involves situations where people use their
records for their own purposes. One of the most common types of records in this
category is a medical record. In many cases, people access their medical records
Medical Information Bureau, The Facts
https://www.mib.com/facts_about_mib.html.
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to provide them to other healthcare providers or to understand their diagnosis and
treatment.
In the United States, HIPAA provides a robust right to access medical records, but
thus far, compliance has been poor. According to one study, more than 50% of
medical providers did not meet the basic requirements in HIPAA for providing
medical records.97 A further 20% of the providers would not provide records until
requests were escalated to supervisors.98 Additionally, HIPAA requires health
information to be disclosed to patients via email if they prefer, but many healthcare
providers refuse to do so.99 HIPAA states that covered entities “must provide the
individual with access to the protected health information in the form and format
requested by the individual, if it is readily producible in such form and format.”100
However, many covered entities do not send records by email and getting
electronic copies can be quite difficult. One study found that providers insisted on
sending paper records, faxes, and CDs even when patients asked for records to be
sent electronically.101 Another study showed that only 33% of hospitals studied
included email as an option on their record release forms.102 These longstanding
problems with access prompted the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services to begin a targeted enforcement campaign to improve compliance with
HIPAA’s access right.103
One reason for the poor compliance is that many providers have been slow to adopt
modern digital technologies for recordkeeping and communication with patients.
Organizations must make a decision about how much time and resources to
allocate to access requests. Organizations may decide to devote little attention to
access because enforcement is unlikely and the sanctions are not high enough or
are not frequently imposed.
The story with HIPAA access demonstrates an important point: A right is not selfexecuting. Without the appropriate tools and procedures, organizations cannot
administer the right properly and effectively.
A broader and more structural approach in the law would aim to make records
serve individuals rather than merely serve the organizations that keep the records.
For example, the law should consider medical records as an essential tool for the
patient, not as just records for the benefit of the healthcare provider. Rather than
Deven McGraw, Nasha Fitter, and Lisa Belliveau Taylor, Health Care Provider Compliance with
the HIPAA Right of Individual Access: A Scorecard and Survey (Aug.13, 2019).
98 Id.
99 HIPAA, 45 CFR § 164.524 (“The covered entity must provide the individual with access to the
protected health information in the form and format requested by the individual, if it is readily
producible in such form and format.”); Daniel J. Solove, Yes, HIPAA Requires Medical Records to
Be Emailed to Patients if Requested, Privacy+Security Blog, Nov. 29, 2018,
https://teachprivacy.com/hipaa-requires-medical-records-to-be-emailed-to-patients-if-requested/.
100 45 CFR § 164.524.
101 Deven McGraw, Nasha Fitter, and Lisa Belliveau Taylor, Health Care Provider Compliance with
the
HIPAA
Right
of
Individual
Access:
A
Scorecard
and
Survey,
https://www.medrxiv.org/content/medrxiv/early/2019/08/13/19004291.full.pdf.
102 Carolyn T. Lye, Howard P. Forman, Ruiyi Gao, Assessment of US Hospital Compliance With
Regulations for Patients’ Requests for Medical Records, JAMA Network Open (Oct. 5, 2018),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2705850.
103 OCR Resolves Twentieth Investigation in HIPAA Right of Access Initiative with $80,000
Settlement,
Health
and
Human
Services
(Sept.
10,
2021),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2021/09/10/ocr-resolves-twentieth-investigation-in-hipaaright-of-access-initiative-with-settlement.html (“OCR created this initiative to support individuals'
right to timely access their health records at a reasonable cost under the HIPAA Privacy Rule.”).
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merely mandate access, the law could facilitate greater engagement with records.
The law could subsidize better record systems that enable easier and wider patient
access. Instead of waving a stick when providers fail to provide adequate access,
the law could do a lot more to help improve access with carrots.
One way to improve access to medical records might be to require that records be
automatically made available to patients without the need to make a request.104 In
one study, when patients received their records automatically, almost all of the
patients were “enthusiastic” about the program. Doctors viewed the program
positively as well: “Approximately three-quarters of all the doctors said that such
transparency had none of the dreaded impacts on their practice. Many felt there
was more trust, better communication, more shared decision-making and
increased patient satisfaction.”105 None of the doctors chose to stop sharing the
notes with their patients after the study had concluded. The patients benefited
greatly from the increased access: “[A]lmost 80 percent of the patients said that
reading their doctors’ notes helped them to take their medications more regularly
and better follow their doctors’ treatment recommendations.”106

C. RIGHT TO DATA PORTABILITY
Several privacy laws provide people with a right to data portability. This right
requires that organizations provide people with a copy of their data in a form that
they can readily take and use with another organization. The GDPR provides that
data subjects have the right to receive their personal data in a “structured,
commonly used and machine-readable format” and to transmit the data to another
controller “without hindrance.”107 The right to data portability is a cousin to the
right to access; data portability is akin to an access right on steroids giving people
rights to all of their data in a usable format.
As one of the newest EU rights, first emerging under the GDPR, the right to data
portability lags other rights in worldwide recognition. Nonetheless, more recent
privacy laws are recognizing the right to data portability, such as Brazil, Barbados,
Panama, Thailand, and Kenya.108
Automatic access is not necessary or desirable for all types of records, just records where access
would most benefit people.
105 Pauline Chen, Letting Patients Read the Doctor’s Notes, N.Y. Times Blog, Oct. 4, 2012.
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/04/letting-patients-read-the-doctors-notes/.
106 Id.
107 GDPR art. 20(1) (“The data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning
him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and
machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to another controller without
hindrance from the controller to which the personal data have been provided. . . .”).
108 See Brazil Lei Geral Da Proteção De Dados Pessoais (LGPD), Lei No. 13.709, de 14 de Agosto de
2018, Diário Oficial Da Uniao [D.O.U.] de 15.08.2018 (Braz.), English translation at
https://iapp.org/resources/article/brazilian-data-protection-law-lgpd-english-translation/)
(requiring “portability of the data to another service provider or product provider, by the means of
an express request, pursuant with the regulations of the national authority, and subject to
commercial and industrial secrets.”); Thailand Personal Data Protection Act, B.E. 2562 (2019)
(Thai.), https://thainetizen.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/thailand-personal-data-protectionact-2019-en.pdf (“The Data Controller shall arrange such Personal Data to be in the format which is
readable or commonly used by ways of automatic tools or equipment, and can be used or disclosed
by automated means.”); The Data Protection Act, No. 181 (2019) Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 24
§§ 38(1) (“A data subject has the right to receive personal data concerning them in a structured,
commonly used and machine-readable format.”).
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In the US, privacy laws generally lack a right to data portability, but newer state
laws are starting to include this right. For example, the CCPA requires businesses
provide personal information in a portable and “readily usable format” to allow
consumers to transfer the information to another entity “without hindrance.”109
The VCDPA establishes a similar right to data portability.110
1. Enhanced Access and Data Ownership
In many ways, data portability is an extension of the right to access. It is a right to
access with a specification about the format of the data. In this way, the right is a
success; it improves the right to access. However, data portability alone is not the
answer to the shortcomings of the right to access in achieving many of the goals.
At the outset, the data portability right under the GDPR does not involve all
personal data maintained by controllers but only the data that was provided by the
data subject.111 “Provided” means data provided directly or indirectly through user
activity (such as tracking user interaction with an entity’s website).112 Many
organizations maintain data gathered about data subjects in other ways, and this
data is not covered by the GDPR’s right to data portability.
Data portability has less value when data is interconnected with data of others,
such as on social media. Only porting a person’s data without information supplied
by others is incomplete. Porting other people’s information would violate the
privacy of these people. For example, a person’s ability to port a list of email
addresses for their entire set of LinkedIn contacts affects the privacy of those
contacts. Overall, is such portability privacy protective or a privacy risk? The
answer is quite unclear. Moreover, as Peter Swire and Yianni Lagos note, data
portability can increase risks to data security.113
Thus, on many sites where data portability would be most desired by users, there
will be significant limitations on how much data can be ported and how useful
porting the data will be. Moreover, data portability is difficult for regulators to
enforce. Regulators would have to analyze the technology involved and how readily
the data could be ported. Thus far, data portability operates more as a suggestion
than a rigorous requirement.
2. Competition
The right to data portability also aims to serve the goal of promoting competition.
Data portability aims to empower individuals to switch to competitors and not be
Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100(d) (West 2020) (“[T]he information shall be in a portable and, to the
extent technically feasible, readily useable format that allows the consumer to transmit this
information to another entity without hindrance.”).
110 See Consumer Privacy Rights Act, ch. 36, 2021 Va. Legis. Serv. 1, 4 (West) (to be codified at Va.
Code Ann. 59.1-573(A)(4)) (“To obtain a copy of the consumer's personal data that the consumer
previously provided to the controller in a portable and, to the extent technically feasible, readily
usable format that allows the consumer to transmit the data to another controller without hindrance,
where the processing is carried out by automated means”).
111 Sasha Hondagneu-Messner, Data Portability: A Guide and a Roadmap, 47 Rutgers Computer &
Tech. L.J. 240, 254 (2021).
112 Id. at 254-55. For more background on the scope of the GDPR’s right to data portability, see Article
29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability (Apr. 5, 2017).
113 Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer Welfare:
Antitrust and Privacy Critique, 72 Md. L. Rev. 335, 374 (2013).
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locked in because their data is locked up.114 According to guidance by the Article
29 Working Party (now called the European Data Protection Board), data
portability “can foster a more competitive market environment by allowing
consumers more easily to switch providers.”115
However, although it is sometimes assumed that privacy and antitrust are
complementary, Erika Douglas aptly contends that there are significant tensions
between these two domains.116 For example, smaller companies have argued that
they must be able to access and scrape data from large competitors in order to be
competitive. In HiQ Labs v. LinkedIn, LinkedIn blocked HiQ from scraping
personal data from its users’ profiles. HiQ argued that this blocking was anticompetitive. HiQ won the case, but the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and
will be looking at the issue. 117
Data portability often does not work effectively to increase competition. Removing
one’s data from a social media site such as Facebook and placing it elsewhere will
not readily re-create the experience of Facebook. All one’s friends and interwoven
data would not be ported. There is a collective action problem, and it is not readily
solvable by data portability.
As a feature of privacy laws, data portability should aim to enhance competition
for privacy, not just competition in general. There are many other ways to address
general competition, which is what anti-competition law seeks to do. Data
portability thus should have the narrower goal to promote competition about
privacy.
But this goal is doomed without addressing the market failure that prevents
meaningful competition about privacy. People certainly care about privacy, yet
their behavior does not appear to match their stated attitudes.118 Elsewhere, I have
argued that this gap between attitudes and behavior is not a “paradox,” as it has
oft been called, but reflects the fact that attitudes and behaviors regarding privacy
involve different things. Abstractly, many people deeply care about privacy.
Behavior involves concrete and contextual situations involving risk calculations. In
these situations, people are presented with immediate benefits that they can
readily understand. As discussed earlier, people cannot make good cost-benefit
decisions regarding privacy because the implications of the future use of their data
are too complex to figure out. Privacy often does not fare well when balanced
against immediate benefits and technology’s dazzle.
Often, competition about privacy involves a lot of rhetoric about how much a
company cares about privacy, but nothing makes this rhetoric match reality. Just
because a company shouts “privacy” more loudly does not mean it protects privacy
more than other companies.
Whitney Nixdorf, Planting in A Walled Garden: Data Portability Policies to Inform Consumers
How Much (If Any) of the Harvest Is Their Share, 29 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 135, 148
(2019).
115 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on the Right to Data Portability (Apr. 5,
2017).
116 Erika M. Douglas, The New Antitrust/Data Privacy Law Interface, Yale L.J. Forum 647, 661-80
(Jan. 18, 2021).
117 HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2019). For background about the clash
between privacy and anti-competition law, see Erika M. Douglas, The New Antitrust/Data Privacy
Law Interface, Yale L.J. Forum (Jan. 18, 2021).
118 Daniel J. Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2021).
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Moreover, privacy is just one dimension among many that companies might
compete upon. Other dimensions, such as price and quality, are easier for
consumers to understand, assess, and compare. Thus far, these other dimensions
appear to far outmatch privacy in the market.
Data portability, in and of itself, is far from sufficient to create such competition in
privacy. The data portability right seems to rest on the assumption that there is a
healthy market for privacy; the hope is that portability will grease the wheels, and
they will turn. But this hope is unrealistic.
There is a more practical way that the law can help consumers when making
choices between companies – to stop the bad apples with deficient privacy
practices. Strong privacy comes at a cost, as it involves personnel and time to
address privacy adequately. Privacy also might involve forbearance on collecting
or using personal data that has a high opportunity cost. Companies that incur these
costs should not have to compete against companies that shortchange privacy with
underfunded programs without adequate resources or companies that ignore
privacy for greater profit. If companies can get away with being cheap and
opportunistic about privacy, then those companies that do so have an advantage.
For example, they might be able to offer lower prices than other companies that
take privacy seriously.
The law can help prevent this unfair advantage by ensuring that companies cannot
get away with poor privacy practices and cutting corners. Operating in this more
structural way, the law could ensure that companies that try to protect privacy well
are not at a competitive disadvantage.

D. RIGHT TO RECTIFICATION OR CORRECTION
One of the most common rights in privacy laws is the right to rectification or
correction. The right provides individuals with the ability to request that errors in
their records be corrected as well that data be added so that the records reflect the
complete story. For example, under the right to rectification in Article 16 of the
GDPR, data subjects have the right to have errors in their personal data
corrected.119 In addition, data subjects have the right to have “incomplete personal
data completed.”120
1. Accurate Records
A primary goal of the right to rectification is to promote accurate records. This goal
is important because records of personal data are often riddled with errors.
According to a FTC report in 2013, about 5% of consumers “had an error on one of
their credit reports serious enough to result in higher borrowing fees.”121 A health
IT expert estimates that about 70% of medical records have errors.122 These facts
are not surprising because personal data is gathered, processed, and transferred
GDPR art. 16.
GDPR art. 16.
121 CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND
THREATENS DEMOCRACY 150 (2016).
122 Christina Farr, This Patient's Medical Record Said She'd Given Birth Twice - In Fact, She'd Never
Been Pregnant CNBC (2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/09/medical-record-errors-commonhard-to-fix.html (last visited Feb 13, 2020).
119
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on a gigantic scale and with enormous frequency. Errors in data can readily spread
as information flows from one record system to another.
As with other rights, the right to correction places on the onus on individuals to act
as proofreaders of their records. Engaging in free proofreading for organizations is
not a task that many individuals have the time or wherewithal to do. The task does
not scale given the vast number of organizations that collect and process personal
data. Not only is reviewing records time-consuming, but making a correction
request is even more of drain on time. Compounding this problem is the fact that
an individual’s dossier with a particular organization is not static. Data is
constantly being added and changed in the dossier, sometimes even on a daily or
weekly basis. Thus, it is unlikely individuals will be able to continually review their
records at one organization, let alone the hundreds (or perhaps thousands) of
organizations that possess their data.
The problem of record accuracy is exacerbated by the fact that the optimal degree
of accuracy diverges for organizations and individuals. For individuals, an
inaccuracy in records could lead to being charged a higher interest rate, being
denied a loan, being rejected for a job, being barred from flying, or even being
improperly arrested. For organizations, the stakes for errors are much lower. If a
consumer reporting agency has incorrect data, it might miscalculate a credit score.
The harm to the consumer reporting agency is minimal; creditors likely will not
even know about the error and will just move on to offer a loan to someone else. Of
course, very high error rates might not be optimal, but many organizations can
tolerate a moderate error rate.
Thinking about the right to correction in a more structural way, the goal is not
merely to allow individuals to correct errors in particular records but also to ensure
that record systems with personal data are maintained at an appropriate level of
accuracy. This broader goal is one that many privacy laws purport to achieve by
including a principle of “data quality,” typically requiring that personal data be
accurate, complete, and up-to-date. Data quality need not be perfect but should be
reasonable and appropriate for the uses and potential risks. The principle of data
quality is an essential one, as it requires accuracy without placing the onus on
individuals to proofread and correct their records.
Although privacy laws frequently proclaim the data quality principle, it often
amounts to hollow rhetoric. Rarely do the laws have mechanisms to ensure for data
quality beyond merely stating the principle. A more rigorous requirement of data
quality would require concrete ways to monitor organizations to ensure that they
are adhering to the principle. The right to correction should serve as a secondary
level of protection – as a backstop for individuals to correct occasional errors. In
practice, however, enforcement of data quality falls back to individuals, who must
raise right-to-correction complaints or seek to enforce data quality through a
private right of action in laws that have them.
When plaintiffs have sought to use a private right of action for violations of data
quality, courts have undermined their cases with narrow conceptions of harm. In
the United States, the Supreme Court has recently undermined the enforcement of
accuracy. In TransUnion v. Ramirez, TransUnion, a consumer reporting agency,
falsely indicated that more than 8,000 people were terrorists on their credit

31

The Limitations of Privacy Rights

Daniel J. Solove

reports.123 The errors emerged when TransUnion created a service called “Name
Screen” where it would place alerts on credit reports when people were a “potential
match” on the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s
(OFAC) list of terrorists, drug traffickers, and other criminals. The process by
which TransUnion added the alerts was quite shoddy. TransUnion would merely
compare people’s names to the OFAC list.
If the consumer’s first and last name matched the first and last name of
an individual on OFAC’s list, then TransUnion would place an alert on
the credit report indicating that the consumer’s name was a “potential
match” to a name on the OFAC list. TransUnion did not compare any
data other than first and last names. Unsurprisingly, TransUnion’s
Name Screen product generated many false positives. Thousands of lawabiding Americans happen to share a first and last name with one of the
terrorists, drug traffickers, or serious criminals on OFAC’s list of
specially designated nationals.124
The plaintiffs argued that TransUnion failed to follow reasonable procedures to
ensure accuracy, as required by the FCRA.125
The Court ultimately concluded that that only the plaintiffs whose reports were
disclosed to others had standing to sue under the FCRA. Plaintiffs who had the
error in their reports that had not yet been disclosed did not suffer a “concrete
injury” and lacked standing to sue despite FCRA’s granting individuals a statutory
right to sue.126
With this disembowelment by the Court, FCRA’s accuracy requirement is without
meaningful heft or rigor. Instead of placing the onus on people like Ramirez to
police their records, the law should mandate better processes for keeping records
accurate. FCRA purportedly does this with its requirement to use “reasonable
procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy” but the lesson from
TransUnion v. Ramirez is that consumer reporting agencies can avoid being liable
for failing to adhere to this duty.
In many cases, there is the potential for errors in records not to be detected by
individuals or to be discovered too late after damage already has been done.
Returning to TransUnion v. Ramirez, the lead plaintiff only learned about the
error of being mislabelled a terrorist when he tried to buy a car. He was stunned to
be told by the car salesperson that he could not buy the car because he was on a
terrorist list. Had he not tried to buy the car, he might never have known. Without
knowledge, he would not have exercised his right to correct. Many other
individuals had no idea that their records contained this egregious and damaging
error.
Although FCRA’s accuracy requirement might sound strong, especially with the
use of the words “maximum possible accuracy,” in practice, it falls far short. For
example, in Sarver v. Experian, the court held that credit reporting agencies did
not have a duty to analyse reports for “anomalous information.” Doing so would

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190 (2021).
Id.
125 See § 1681e(b).
126 TransUnion, supra note _, at X.
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be too big a burden on the company which processed a ton of data each day.127 The
irony is that the concept behind the obligation of maintaining accuracy was to
ensure that companies did not consume more information than they could chew.
Also, consumer reporting agencies offer credit report monitoring services where
they tout their ability to look for anomalous information, which undercuts the
claim that doing so to meet its statutory obligation is too difficult.
Privacy laws should require more steps to maintain accuracy whenever there is a
risk of harm or negative consequence to people. Relying on rights to correct is too
fragmented and minimal to incentivize organizations to improve the accuracy of
their records. Placing the onus on individuals to bring private rights of action to
enforce data quality requirements puts a big burden on individuals, who must
engage in protracted litigation only to be rebuffed by courts that are reluctant to
find harm. Thus, privacy laws end up with having empty shibboleths about strong
data quality and high accuracy. Instead, concrete procedures should be mandated,
such as reviewing records for anomalies, conducting audits of records for accuracy,
and accountability to regulators for accuracy.
The law also must take more proactive steps to ensure that records are accurate.
For example, HIPAA is commonly believed to have a right to correction, but it
actually merely has a right to “amendment.”128 HIPAA allows patients to request
that notations about errors be added to their file but not that the errors be removed
or changed.129 Thus, if incorrect data infects a record, there is no way to cleanse it
out. Errors become akin to a chronic disease that must be forever managed; they
do not go away. Erroneous data can readily take on a life of its own, and correction
notations often go unread or unnoticed. Of course, there are certain reasons why
erroneous information should not be entirely deleted, as the data could explain a
diagnosis or need to be preserved in case of future litigation. But the erroneous
data could be archived and removed from the main part of the record.
The right to rectification is an important one for occasional situations where people
become aware of errors in their records that they want to take the time to fix. But
the right is not well-designed to achieve the larger structural goal of accurate
records.
2. Accurate Decisions and Predictive Judgments
Accurate records are important, but their value is not primarily based on accuracy
for its own sake. Instead, accurate records are part of a larger more important goal
– accurate decisions. Inaccurate records have the potential to lead to decisions that
can cause harm to people and that are unfair.
Privacy laws mainly focus on accurate records rather than accurate decisions. For
example, FCRA seeks to ensure accurate records, but says little about the quality
of credit scoring. A credit score can be inaccurate not only if it is based on wrong
data, but also if based on a faulty formula. The same is true for many decisions
based on algorithms; the decisions could be flawed because the data is bad or
because the algorithm is bad. Therefore, accurate records are far from sufficient to
Sarver v. Experian Information Solutions, 390 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2004).
HIPAA, 45 C.F.R. § 164.526.
129 HIPAA, 45 C.F.R. § 164.526(c)(1) (providing that the covered entity must make the amendment
by “identifying the records in the designated record set that are affected by the amendment and
appending or otherwise providing a link to the location of the amendment”).
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ensure accurate decisions. Accurate records are certainly a necessary condition to
accurate decisions, but much more than accuracy of records must be regulated to
ensure for accurate decisions.
The law focuses on data rather than decisions likely because of a fear of becoming
too paternalistic. Although lawmakers should not be writing algorithms, there is a
wide range of ways that the law can regulate algorithms without mandating
specifics. The law could establish certain factors as off-limits. The law could set
certain ideals for decisions and create accountability mechanisms to check if
decisions are meeting these ideals.
Beyond accurate decisions, there is an even broader goal that the law should strive
to achieve – appropriate decisions. Increasingly, predictive decisions are being
made about people based upon the data in their records.130 The data in a record
could be entirely correct but predictions based upon it could be wrong. In this
scenario, a right to correct the data will not be useful unless the prediction is part
of the record and can be proven wrong. A predictive decision is often impossible to
prove as incorrect because it is a prediction of a future occurrence that has not yet
happened.
Only in a few contexts does the law protect against predictive judgments. For
example, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) prohibits
discrimination in employment and insurance based on genetic information. 131
However, laws generally do not restrict decisions based upon predictions or allow
people to contest the assumptions and judgments behind the prediction.
Ultimately, the most important goal for privacy law is to protect people from faulty
decisions. Decisions can be faulty because they are inaccurate, but predictive
decisions often cannot be assessed as accurate or inaccurate. Nevertheless,
predictive decisions must be fair, transparent, and not contrary to societal values.
Not only is the right to correct errors in records woefully insufficient as a means to
make records more accurate systematically, but the right fails because it is focused
on data and on accuracy. The law must not just focus on accurate data but also on
accurate decisions. And, when regulating decisions, the law must regulate not just
accuracy but also adequacy. The right to rectification is unable to achieve these
goals. The law must regulate to ensure a minimum level of quality in decisions.
Accurate data is a means to a larger end. It does not make sense to wash and wax
a car and then drive it off a cliff. Pristine data is meaningless if decisions made
based on it remain shoddy.

E. RIGHT TO ERASURE OR DELETION
Under the GDPR and many other privacy laws, data subjects have a right to
“erasure” of their personal information.132 This right is also called a right to
CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND
THREATENS DEMOCRACY 133 (2016).
131 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub.L. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
132 GDPR art. 17; Argentina’s Personal Data Protection Law; Peru’s Personal Data Protection Law;
Uruguay’s Law on the Protection of Personal Data and Habeas Data Action; Brazil’s LGPD; Kosovo’s
Law on the Protection of Personal Data; Montenegro’s Personal Data Protection Law; Russia’s
Federal Law on Personal Data; Turkey’s LPPD; Ghana’s Data Protection Act; Israel’s Privacy
Protection Law; Hong Kong’s Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance; South Korea’s Personal
Information Protection Act. Privacy laws typically provide for some exceptions to the right of
130
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“deletion” or “elimination” or “cancellation.”
There has been significant confusion about the meaning of the right to erasure. The
right is often conflated with the right to be forgotten, which is actually quite
distinct. The GDPR exacerbates the confusion by putting the right to be forgotten
in parentheses after the title of the right to erasure.133
There are several different circumstances under which laws recognize a right to
erasure, such as illegally-processed data, withdrawn consent, or data that is no
longer necessary. The GDPR recognizes all of these circumstances as ones
justifying erasure.134 The erasure rights of many other laws do not allow for erasure
in some of these circumstances.
Deletion rights often allow for data subjects to demand the deletion of data that
was properly processed with their consent. Under the GDPR’s right to erasure,
individuals can have data deleted if they withdraw consent to processing and if
there is not another lawful basis to process.135 Data subjects also can have data
erased if they exercise their right to object to the processing and “there are no
overriding legitimate grounds for the processing.”136
In the US, only a few federal laws provide for a right to delete. COPPA through its
regulations requires a right of parents to delete data gathered from their children
as well as data that is no longer necessary for the purposes of collection.137
Recent US state privacy laws provide for rights to delete. Under Virginia’s CDPA,
people “have the right to delete personal data provided by or obtained about the
consumer.”138 Likewise, under the CCPA, provides people with a broad right to
delete personal data.139 Additionally, when a business receives a consumer deletion
request, it must explicitly notify and instruct any third parties that have received
the consumer’s personal information to delete it.
The VCDPA and CCPA are somewhat broader than the GDPR for erasure because
the GDPR permits erasure when a person withdraws previously-supplied consent
to process whereas the VCDPA and CCPA allow individuals to delete data even
beyond the basis of withdrawal of consent. The VDCPA has the broadest deletion
right, applying to information “provided by or obtained about the consumer.”140
The CCPA only applies to personal data “which the business has collected from the
consumer.”141
deletion, such as ensuring security, protecting against illegal activities, complying with a legal
obligation, or ensuring the exercise of free speech.
133 GDPR art. 17 (“Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)”).
134 GDPR art 17.
135 GDPR art 17(b).
136 GDPR art 17(c).
137 COPPA Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(d)(3) (a “parent can review or have deleted the child's personal
information, and refuse to permit further collection or use of the child's information, and state the
procedures for doing so”); COPPA Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.10 (“An operator of a Web site or online
service shall retain personal information collected online from a child for only as long as is reasonably
necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected. The operator must delete
such information using reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access to, or use of, the
information in connection with its deletion.”).
138 VCDPA, § 59.1-573(A)(3).
139 CCPA, 1798.105.
140 VCDPA, § 59.1-573(A)(3).
141 CCPA, 1798.105.
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The most common circumstance that laws recognize as justifying erasure involves
data that was improperly gathered. The GDPR’s right to erasure extends to data
that was “unlawfully processed.”142 Deleting such data follows basic legal principles
of disgorging ill-gotten gains. Under many privacy laws, the data protection
authority can order the destruction of improperly-gathered data.
1. Preventing Ill-Gotten Gains
A key goal of the right to erasure is to prevent organizations from keeping
improperly-collected personal data.143 The onus should not be on individuals to
pursue actions to disgorge ill-gotten gains. The law ought to ensure that entities do
not maintain data that they gathered or processed in violation of the law. In many
cases, the law does so without placing the burden on individuals to enforce it.
For example, in several cases in the United States, the FTC has ordered the
destruction of such data.144 In one case, for instance, the FTC ordered Everalbum
to delete photos and videos that it collected from consumers and use for its facial
recognition technology without their consent.145
As with other rights and other goals, the right to erasure is useful in a secondary
role to achieve the aim of disgorgement, but it is not sufficient to be the primary
mechanism. Not enough individuals will exercise their rights to ensure that all the
wrongly-acquired data is deleted. When privacy laws move beyond relying on
individuals to exercise their right to erasure to police ill-gotten gains, they are
dramatically more effective.
As Lauren Scholz argues, restitution should play a much larger role as a remedy
for privacy violations.146 The law should aim to address “the wrongful profit and
the incentives that it creates for businesses.”147 No company should come out ahead
for violating the law. Economic incentives must favor compliance.

142

GDPR art 17(d).

143 Restitution involves restoring victims to where they would have been absent

the wrongful conduct.
Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 Ind. L.J. 653 (2019). Disgorgement involves returning
the unlawful gains that a wrongdoer obtained through unjust enrichment. With restitution, the focus
is on restoring what the victims lost. With disgorgement, the focus is on surrendering the profits that
the wrongdoer gained. Restitution does not depend upon deliberate wrongdoing; even an innocent
mistake that unjustly enriches a defendant can be subject to restitution. For example, restitution can
involve a third party that was unwittingly given an undeserved benefit. Restitution can be used
against third parties that benefit from another party’s actions. For example, if a company wrongfully
shares personal data with a third party, that third party could be ordered to purge the data.
144 See, e.g., In the Matter of Midwest Recovery Systems (FTC. Nov. 30, 2020) (settlement requiring
deletion of debt information); In the Matter of Flo Health, Inc. (FTC, June 22, 2021) (settlement
requiring Flo Health to instruct third parties that it improperly shared personal data with to delete
that data). In 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court took away the FTC’s ability to pursue some of these
remedies. In AMG Capital Management v. Federal Trade Commission, the Court held that the FTC
lacked authority under the FTC Act “to seek, [or] a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as
restitution or disgorgement.” Acting FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter responded to the
Court’s decision by saying that “the Court has deprived the FTC of the strongest tool we had to help
consumers when they need it most” and that the Court “ruled in favor of scam artists and dishonest
corporations, leaving average Americans to pay for illegal behavior.” AMG Capital Management v.
Federal Trade Commission, 141 S.Ct. 1341 (2021).
145 In the Matter of Everalbum, Inc. (FTC, May 7, 2021).
146 Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 Ind. L.J. 653 (2019)
147 Id. at 677-78.
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2. Data Minimization
A goal of deletion rights is to further the principle of data minimization, which
typically states that data shall not be retained for longer than necessary to achieve
the purposes stated at collection. Many laws have this principle. In addition to the
right to delete, this principle is sometimes backed up by data retention
requirements that explicitly require the deletion or anonymization of data that is
no longer needed.148 As Meg Leta Jones notes, one goal of a right to erasure is to
clean out stale personal data: “Information loses context over time. It becomes
displaced from its original setting.”149
Quite a number of privacy laws provide people with the right to demand deletion
of personal data that is no longer necessary for the purposes for which it was
collected.150
The right to delete unnecessary data is different from data retention limitations.
The right to delete is a right invoked by a data subject. A data retention obligation
requires that data be deleted regardless of whether a data subject had requested it.
Although a right to delete unnecessary data can be valuable to data subjects under
certain situations, data subjects will find it highly impractical to use this right more
systematically. There are so many entities that gather and store personal data that
it will be nearly impossible for people to identify them all, figure out which data is
no longer necessary for the purposes originally collected, and then make the
deletion request. In short, this right does not scale, and it is not a feasible way to
ensure adherence to the principle of data minimization. A right to erasure is thus
secondary to data retention limitations.151
Data minimization must have rigor. Otherwise, it becomes a hollow principle that
sounds as though it is protecting privacy but is doing no actual work. Data
minimization is difficult to police, as it involves relevance to purposes and involves
judgment calls. But if it is not done rigorously, then data minimization is empty.
Privacy laws often state data minimization principles without a practical way to
enforce them, rendering them little more than hollow feel-good rhetoric.

F. RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
The so-called “right to be forgotten” (sometimes referred to as the “right to
oblivion”) emerged from the right to erasure. The right to be forgotten requires the
removal of personal data from search engine results if a valid request is made by
an individual.
The right to be forgotten is often conflated with the right to erasure or deletion, but
the two rights are distinct. The right to erasure requires destruction of data. The
COPPA Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.10 (“An operator of a Web site or online service shall retain personal
information collected online from a child for only as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the
purpose for which the information was collected. The operator must delete such information using
reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access to, or use of, the information in
connection with its deletion.”); Cite other laws: Costa Rica,
149 MEG LETA JONES, CTRL+Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 123 (2016).
150 GDPR art. 17, cite other laws.
151 See Alexander Tsesis, The Right to Erasure: Privacy, Data Brokers, and the Indefinite Retention
of Data, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 433, 435 (2014) (“While businesses have legitimate reasons to use
data in their day-to-day operations, a statutorily defined expiration period is necessary to preserve
the data subjects' dignitary and autonomy rights.”).
148
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right to be forgotten, in contrast, does not involve deleting data. Instead, it is best
characterized as a right to obscurity.152 The data is not destroyed but is simply not
publicly disseminated in search results.
The conflation of the right to erasure and the right to be forgotten is made in the
GDPR, which puts the “right to be forgotten” in parentheses after the title to the
section on the right to erasure.153 But this section involves a right to erasure and
does not address the right to be forgotten.
The right to be forgotten emerged from a judicial interpretation of the right to
erasure under the EU Data Protection Directive, the predecessor to the GDPR. In
Google Spain v. AEPD (2014), the EU Court of Justice (CJEU), a Google search of
the name of a Spanish citizen returned a result with links to a Spanish newspaper
with information about his debts. The person wanted Google to remove these
items from search results under his name. The CJEU required that Google remove
certain search results linked to a person’s name.154
The right to be forgotten merely requires that search engines remove links to third
party web pages when data is inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive. The underlying
data does not have to be deleted. Thus, the newspaper websites with the data about
the person’s debts could continue to display the information. Nor did Google have
to delete the information; it just was restricted from disclosing it in search results.
The GDPR, which was in the later stages of being forged when the right to be
forgotten was born, attempts to codify the right to erasure by adding it in
parentheses to the right to erasure. However, as Miquel Peguera observes, the
GDPR’s right to erasure “does not deal specifically with search engines. It also does
not establish with particularity a data subject's right to request the delisting of links
displayed in search engines' results for name-specific queries – in short, it does not
codify Google Spain.”155
Subsequent to Google Spain, judicial decisions have embraced a right to be
forgotten in other countries, including Mexico, Japan, Russia, Colombia, and
India.156
Certain laws in the US offer limited rights that resemble the right to be forgotten.
For example, expungement allows juveniles to have conviction information
sealed.157 In 2013, California passed an “online eraser” law that provides children
under 18 with a right to delete information they shared on social media.158 These
rights are much more limited than the broad right to be forgotten in the EU.

Evan Selinger and Woodrow Hartzog, Google Can’t Forget You But It Should Make You Hard to
Find, Wired (May 20, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/05/google-cant-forget-you-but-itshould-make-you-hard-to-find/ (“[T]he talk about forgetting and disappearing is really concern
about the concept of obscurity in the protection of our personal information.”).
153 GDPR art. 17.
154 Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, in the European Court of Justice,
Case C-131/12, 2014 E.C.R. 317.
155 Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of the Right to Be Delisted, 18 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 507,
557 (2016).
156 Dawn C. Nunziato, The Fourth Year of Forgetting: The Troubling Expansion of the Right to be
Forgotten, 39 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1011, 1059-64 (2018).
157 See infra.
158 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22580-81, S.B. 568, 2013 Leg. Rev. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
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1. Obscurity
As mentioned above, the right to be forgotten is really a right to obscurity rather
than a right to erasure. Privacy is not just about keeping secrets hidden away from
everyone; it is also about modulating the accessibility of personal data and the
boundaries of how it can flow.159 As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in DOJ v.
Reporters Committee, “Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records
that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and
local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located
in a single clearinghouse of information.”160
Obscurity of data has long been built into the social fabric. It has existed for
centuries. As Woodrow Hartzog and Fred Stutzman contend, “people expect
obscurity in everyday life.”161 Obscurity is a “middle ground protection” between
the extremes of secrecy and being widely conspicuous.162
Before the Internet, much personal data was shielded through practical obscurity.
Hunting for data from various sources was difficult and time-consuming. For
example, obtaining information from public records would often involve traveling
to many local government offices at great time and expense.
Digital technologies have greatly eviscerated practical obscurity.163 Information is
now vastly more accessible, which can thwart privacy expectations. What was once
a needle in a haystack is now available at the click of a mouse.
To return to the example of public records, with the rise of the Internet,
government entities have put their records online in electronic form, vastly
increasing the accessibility of these records.164 Large companies routinely vacuum
up these records to compile massive databases of personal data about millions of
people. This loss in obscurity results in uses of public records that are far beyond
the original aims of freedom of information laws. These laws (also called sunshine
laws) aim to make government activities more transparent. Today, public records
are swept up en masse by Big Data corporations to construct gigantic databases
about people. Instead of shedding light on the government, these databases are
used to shed light on the lives of individuals.165
Enabling people to make right to be forgotten requests is woefully insufficient to
address the problems caused by the loss of obscurity of personal data. As with other
rights, the onus is placed on the individual to request that each search engine
remove links to the data. It remains unclear whether the right would extend to
many of the companies that are gobbling up all the data as their uses may fall under
permissible grounds for data gathering without consent, such as legitimate
purposes under the GDPR. And, in the US, no justification is needed.
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008).
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
161 Woodrow Hartzog & Fred Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 California Law Review 1,
8 (2013).
162 Id. at _.
163 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 86
Minn. L. Rev. 1137, 1176-78 (2002); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic D. Stutzman, The Case for Online
Obscurity, 101 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2013).
164 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the Constitution, 86
Minn. L. Rev. 1137 (2002).
165 Id.
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Unfortunately, in Google Spain, the CJEU only vaguely conceptualized the right to
be forgotten.166 The CJEU did not specify the scope and applicability of the right,
such as whether it extends beyond search engines. Although, the court noted that
freedom of speech and the public interest in obtaining data are also to be
considered in the balance, the court did not provide much guidance about how this
balance should occur.167 Instead, the court punted the balancing to organizations
without sufficient oversight.168
In stats released by Google, there were about 800,000 requests in the year
following the CJEU decision, with the number settling down to be consistently
around 500,000 requests per year.169 Roughly 50% of the delisting requests are
granted and 50% are denied.170 From the data supplied by Google, it is difficult to
evaluate how well the delisting decisions are being made. The quantity of requests
on its face might seem like a high number, but it is actually quite low when put in
the context of the massive population of the EU plus the vast amount of visits to
Google’s site from the EU.
The right to be forgotten aims to achieve obscurity in a way that directly conflicts
with free speech values. As Robert Post contends, the CJEU wrongly singled out
search engines such as Google, characterizing them as mere profit-generating
corporations. Instead, Post argues, “Internet search engines underwrite the virtual
communicative space in which democratic public opinion is now partially
formed.”171 The Internet would be “opaque” without the ability to locate
information.172
In many of its applications, the right to be forgotten would run afoul of the First
Amendment to the US Constitution, as it would bar the communication of
potentially newsworthy information or information from court records or public
records.173 Thus, in the US, the First Amendment will significantly restrict the use
of the right to be forgotten, leaving individuals without recourse.
Even without any First Amendment roadblocks, enabling people to make
individual requests to be forgotten is not enough to protect them. Individuals who
know how to make right to be forgotten requests and who are highly motivated
might weary from the extensive labor of making requests. If Google were the sole
repository of personal data in the world, the individual’s burden might be eased,
but Google is just one of many companies that maintain personal data that an
Robert Post contends that the CJEU decision has inconsistencies and the CJEU wrongly theorized
the right. Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right To Be
Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 Duke L.J. 981 (2018).
167 The court stated: “Whilst it is true that the data subject’s rights protected by those articles also
override, as a general rule, that interest of internet users, that balance may however depend, in
specific cases, on the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s
private life and on the interest of the public in having that information, an interest which may vary,
in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life.”
168 Patricia Sanchez Abril & Jacqueline D. Lipton, The Right to Be Forgotten: Who Decides What the
World Forgets?, 103 Ky. L.J. 363, 366 (2015).
169 Requests to delist content under European privacy law, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY REPORT,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview?hl=en_GB (last visited Oct. 17, 2021).
170 Id.
171 Post, Google Spain, supra note X, at 990.
172 Id. at 1043.
173 Dawn C. Nunziato, The Fourth Year of Forgetting: The Troubling Expansion of the Right to be
Forgotten, 39 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1011, 1042-46 (2018).
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individual might want to be forgotten. Moreover, individuals might think that they
are succeeding in zapping data from the Internet only to later discover that the
same facts can be inferred from other data about them online.
As with other individual rights, the right to be forgotten fails to address the more
systemic problem of the loss of obscurity. Large corporations can still vacuum up
massive quantities of personal data. Obscurity is rapidly becoming extinct. A few
individuals might fight back by requesting specific information be removed from
specific sites, but these cases are far too isolated, fragmented, and specific to make
a sufficient social impact.
As more thorough and effective way to build back obscurity in the digital age, the
law should impose duties to preserve obscurity. For example, government entities
should have a duty to protect privacy in their records. In many cases, records are
just dumped online without considering the consequences. When the government
makes records available, it should be required to conduct a privacy impact
assessment and determine ways to protect the data from misuse. Some states have
passed statues that limit the use of certain public records by making requesters
agree to limitations in use in order to access the records.174 All states should do so.
Duties can also be imposed on private sector entities that share data on individuals
for various purposes. In US law, there actually is a limited requirement of
forgetting under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) – a provision that prevents
consumer reporting agencies from reporting in certain instances bankruptcies that
are more than 10 years old, as well as lawsuits, judgments, and criminal
convictions that are more than 7 years old.175 The law does not require that the
information be deleted, just that it not be disclosed in credit reports. These
restrictions do not depend upon individuals having to invoke them; they are
automatic. More privacy laws should impose similar restrictions that do not put
the onus on individuals.
Another US law, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA),
prohibits employers from obtaining employee or applicant genetic information
except under certain limited circumstances.176 This law does not focus on the
erasure of genetic data; instead, it works by limiting dissemination, thus making
the data more obscure. GINA is a direct restriction; it is not a right that individuals
must invoke.
2. Second Chances
Another goal behind the right to be forgotten is to provide space for people to grow
and to allow people to have second chances. As John Dewey aptly stated, a person
is not “something complete, perfect, finished” but is “something moving, changing,
discrete, and above all initiating instead of final.”177 People evolve and mature, a
process impeded by shackling them to their past.178

Law in LAPD case.
FCRA, 15 U.S.C. 1681c(a)-(b).
176 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881.
177 JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 167 (Jo Ann Boydston ed. 1987) (originally published in
1925).
178 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 72-73
(2007).
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As Viktor Mayer-Schonberger observes, the ubiquity of digital data creates a
“synthetic past reconstructed from the limited information digital memory has
stored about it, an utterly skewed patchwork devoid of time and open to
manipulation.”179 He aptly contends that digital memory “denies development and
refuses to acknowledge that all humans change all the time."180
Expungement is a longstanding variation of a right to be forgotten. In the law of
the US and other countries, expungement involves destroying or sealing criminal
justice records from court systems or police departments.181 In the US,
expungement has largely been an issue of state law.182 Most states provide juveniles
with a right to petition to expunge a conviction.183
In practice, expungement has several significant limitations. It only involves
certain types of data (criminal justice data) from certain types of records
(government records).184 Expungement is also often a time-consuming process
that involves considerable hassle.185
Expungement also fails to remove the data from other entities where it is available,
such as newspapers or background check companies.186 With modern technology
allowing companies to vacuum up public record data and compile gigantic
searchable databases of it and with the ready availability of archived news articles
online, expungement has lost its efficacy in today’s digital age.187
In the US, the First Amendment severely restricts the ability of privacy law to stop
the media from continuing to make expunged data available.188 Some media
entities are attempting to revitalize expungement by removing information about
people’s identities from archived stories about criminal convictions.189 These
voluntary efforts are laudable, but they depend solely upon the discretion of the
media organizations; the law cannot force them to do so. But the law could
incentivize companies to provide for obscurity through carrots rather than sticks.
Ultimately, the responsibility to protect obscurity depends significantly on how the
government manages its records. In many circumstances, the government does not
adequately consider privacy when generating and disseminating records. For
example, court records can contain data about bankruptcy, health, mental illness,
sexual assault, and other sensitive matters. Protective orders could be used to
shield some of the information, but ultimately, there might come a time when the
information might be relevant to a judicial decision. Excluding the information
might conflict with a fully transparent judicial decision, as the facts that a court is
VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 123 (2009).
Id. at 125.
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relying upon are often essential to understanding and assessing the holding. A
more viable option might be to allow a litigant to proceed under a pseudonym.
Proceeding under a pseudonym might not be a perfect protection of privacy, but it
might present enough obscurity to provide a meaningful degree of protection.
Unfortunately, the decision about proceeding under a pseudonym is left to the
discretion of judges, with courts rarely permitting plaintiffs to proceed under a
pseudonym.190 As one court held: “Lawsuits are public events. A plaintiff should be
permitted to proceed anonymously only in those exceptional cases.”191
However, even highly important cases have involved the use of pseudonyms
without undercutting the integrity of the case. Many U.S. Supreme Court cases
have involved pseudonymous litigants, such as Jane Roe in Roe v. Wade. Even on
its own initiative, the Supreme Court changed a sexual assault victim’s name to just
initials in Florida Star v. B.J.F.192
A more systemic acceptance of using pseudonyms in civil litigation would help
shield personal data from widespread exposure. The judiciary as well as
government agencies are shirking their important responsibility to promote
obscurity.

G. RIGHTS TO OBJECTION AND RESTRICTION (OR OPT OUT)
The rights to objection and restriction are defined in separate articles of the GDPR,
but they often work in tandem. At Article 21, the GDPR provides a right to object.193
Data subjects can object at any time to the processing of personal data that is based
on the lawful bases of public interest or legitimate interests. When a data subject
objects, the burden is on the controller to “demonstrate compelling legitimate
grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the
data subject or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.”194
Under the GDPR Article 18, data subjects have a right to restriction – to request
that a data controller stop processing their personal data under certain
circumstances. These circumstances include when the data subject contests the
accuracy of the personal data or when the data subject has objected to the
processing.195
The right to object works in tandem with the right to restriction, but the rights are
different. The right to restriction involves the temporary or permanent stoppage of
processing. The right to object involves the grounds upon which data subjects may
object to the processing of their data. One of the main grounds for restriction is a
valid objection.
1. Objectionable Processing
Most privacy laws around the world give data subjects the ability to withdraw
See Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The use
of fictitious names is disfavored, and the judge has an independent duty to determine whether
exceptional circumstances justify such a departure from the normal method of proceeding in federal
courts.”).
191 Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992).
192 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
193 GDPR art. 21.
194 GDPR art. 21.1
195 GDPR art 18.
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consent from processing. When this right is invoked, further processing of the data
must stop, unless there is another lawful basis to process it without consent. 196
The rights to object and restrict place the onus on individuals to learn about the
purposes of processing and raise objections. Only in rare circumstances will
individuals do so.
The rights to object and restrict are limited. The GDPR does not provide people
with a right to stop the processing of their data whenever they desire. Instead, data
processing is only stopped when data processing is in violation of the law or no
longer with a legal basis.
Although similar to the right to object, the right to withdraw consent and stop
processing is both broader and narrower. It is broader because consent can be
withdrawn for any reason whereas the right to object must involve unjustifiable
processing. The right to withdraw consent is also narrower because it only involves
situations where data is being processed with consent. If the data is processed
under other lawful bases that do not involve consent, then this right does not apply.
In many cases, personal data is processed without consent. The right to object can
only be invoked when data is processed pursuant to the public interest or to
legitimate interests.
2. Opt Out or Opt In
In the US, only a few laws provide a similar right to restrict processing, though
many laws provide related rights of opt out or opt in. Opting out involves taking
action to choose not to have personal data collected, used, or disclosed. 197 In
contrast, opting in means that people have to take an affirmative action to indicate
consent, such as to check a box.198
Opt out rights are a close cousin of restriction or objection rights. All of these rights
involve individuals taking an affirmative step to stop certain types of processing of
their data.
The GDPR clearly rejects consent based on inaction, so opt out is out. In the US,
privacy law is divided between opt-in laws and opt-out laws. Examples of opt-in
laws include HIPAA for all uses and disclosures beyond those for treatment,
payment, or healthcare operations, and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act (COPPA).199
Many laws use a mix of opt-ins and opt-outs. For example, the federal Video
Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) has an opt in for most types of sharing of personal
data but an opt out for sharing names, addresses, and the subject matter of videos
for marketing.200 The Cable Communications Policy Act has an opt in for personal
data about cable subscribers but an opt out for just the subscribers’ names and
addresses.201
A large number of US privacy laws provide opt out rights. As discussed above, opt
GDPR art. 7.3
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out is part of the notice-and-choice approach, where consent is presumed from
inaction (the failure to out out). The GLBA, CAN-SPAM Act, TCPA, and other laws
rely heavily on opt out rights.
The emerging breed of state laws regulating privacy also relies heavily on opt out
rights. Although the CCPA defines consent as “any freely given, specific, informed
and unambiguous,” it mostly provides opt out rights.202 The CCPA is obsessed with
data transfer; other uses of personal data are mostly not covered. Thus, the CCPA
allows individuals to opt out of the sale or sharing of their personal data, but not
most uses that data controllers will undertake.203 Similar opt out rights are
provided by VDCPA and the Colorado Privacy Act.204
Some privacy laws attempt to strengthen opt out rights by making the mechanisms
to opt out more conspicuous and easy. For example, under the CCPA, businesses
must provide a clear and conspicuous link on their internet home page titled “Do
Not Sell or Share My Personal Information” that allows a consumer to opt out of
the sale or sharing of their personal information.205
However, providing buttons still does not address the problematic fictions of
consent that pervade the notice-and-choice approach. Even when opt out is
conspicuous, people often do not want to undertake the chore of opting out.
3. Control Over Personal Data
Another goal of the rights of objection, restriction, opt in, and opt out is to give
people control over their personal data. These rights, however, often just provide
the illusion of control. Moreover, as Ari Waldman aptly observes, “Rights of control
still require individuals to overcome every trick designed into platforms that
encourage inertia or inaction or disclosure.”206
The EU approach in the GDPR is to require a valid justification for data processing.
This restrictive approach is generally avoided in the US, which has a general
philosophy that if there is no harm, then companies should be able to use data in
whatever ways they desire.
Even with the EU approach, the right to object can readily become an exercise in
documentation. If a data controller has documented the legitimate interest and
how the processing will not override data subject rights and interests, the
controller can overcome an individual’s objection. The onus remains on the
individual to object, and most people will not have the time or wherewithal to
object systematically to make a palpable difference for their privacy.
In the US, opting out puts the onus on the individual. Opting in is better, as it does
not rely on the fiction that inaction means consent, but once a person has opted in,
the onus is on the individual to monitor the use to ensure that the data is being
used properly.

CCPA, 1798.140(h).
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It can be easy to entice people to opt in with discounts or with other means. For
example, after the GDPR became effective in 2018, many websites added cookie
notices to obtain affirmative consent for the use of cookies. On the surface, the
cookie notices appear as though privacy law has achieved a great success, as the
cookie notices generate many people clicking on a button to accept them.
Ironically, though, the cookie notices are actually creating a fictitious consent.
Many cookie notices pop up as a person immediately as that person visits a website,
and they present the choice to accept cookies or click a button for other options.
People do not want to take the time to explore the other options; they want to go
to the site. Many are likely to click to accept the cookies rather than go through the
detour. This is one way that organizations can get people to opt in even when they
really are not really consenting.
Another way that this method of obtaining opt in consent is used is by presenting
people with a lengthy terms of service or other long and cumbersome documents
that nobody will read. People must click that they accept these terms or agree to
these documents. This is meaningless opt in consent. In is a formalistic exercise
that makes people appear to opt in, but it fails to reflect actual informed consent.
As discussed earlier, the law too often will be satisfied with formalities rather than
real meaningful requirements. Formalities end up creating fictions that look good
on the surface but are hollow underneath. Stating the use in a privacy notice that
nobody reads fails to factor meaningfully in people’s forming their expectations.
This approach would move away from the maligned and discredited notice-andchoice approach. Sites can also get nearly everyone to click an accept button with
hardly anyone understanding what they have accepted or even wanting to accept.
The law can protect privacy in far more effective ways than putting the onus on
people to figure out the complex and intricate dimensions of privacy and the
possible risks and consequences of allowing the collection, use, or disclosure of
their personal data. The law should define at least the basic boundaries of data use.
Data should be processed in ways consistent with people’s expectations. Existing
privacy law allows for processing that might be unexpected for many people as long
as the processing is mentioned in a privacy notice. As discussed above, most people
do not read privacy notices, so this approach does not work. Instead, the law should
focus on expectations. The burden should be on organizations to prove that they
took reasonable measures to ensure that a data use was not unexpected.

I. RIGHT TO NOT BE SUBJECT TO AUTOMATED DECISIONS
The GDPR provides individuals with a “right not to be subject to a decision based
solely on automated processing, including profiling.”207 Individuals have the “at
least the right to obtain human intervention . . . to express his or her point of view
and to contest the decision.”208
The privacy laws of a few countries provide for a similar right, though most
countries still do not recognize this right.209 Brazil’s LGPD provides data subjects
GDPR, supra note X, art. 22(1) (“The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a
decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”).
208 Id. at art 22(3).
209 Lei Geral Da Proteção De Dados Pessoais (LGPD), Lei No. 13.709, de 14 de Agosto de 2018, DIÁRIO
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with a right to request a review of decisions made solely based on automated
processing.210 Controllers must disclose the criteria and procedures used for an
automated decision, but the disclosure can be restricted to protect commercial
secrecy.211 Some laws only apply when the process produces negative or harmful
effects to data subjects (Panama); other laws apply regardless of the harmfulness
of the effects (GDPR).212 Similar to the GDPR, the CCPA provides consumers with
rights to opt out of automated decision-making, to learn about the algorithmic
logic involved, and to know about the likely outcome.213
The GDPR provides for exceptions to this right, such as if the decision is necessary
for a contract between the data subject and the controller, if it is authorized by the
law of a union or member state of which the controller is subject, or if individuals
provide explicit consent.214
1. Algorithmic Transparency
Several articles of the GDPR provide supporting rights to the automated
processing right by requiring a limited degree of algorithmic transparency:
Controllers must inform data subjects about the existence of automated decisionmaking, meaningful information about the logic involved, and the contemplated
consequences.215
Algorithmic transparency is not a panacea because the logic of many algorithms
evolves and is dependent not just on an individual’s data but on the collective
personal data of everyone. Algorithms find patterns in the aggregated data. To
understand why a particular algorithm made a particular decision about a person,
not only would one need to know the individual’s data and the logic of the
algorithm but also the data of other people used by the algorithm. But this data
cannot be provided without compromising the privacy of other individuals.
For meaningful transparency, automated decisions should be understandable.
With machine learning, however, automated decisions can become quite
complicated. Even with transparency, the decisions can be problematic and unfair.
Transparency is thus important, but it is far from enough to protect people from
OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 15.08.2018 (Braz.), translated in Brazilian General Data Protection Law
(LGPD, English Translation), International Association of Privacy Professionals,
(https://iapp.org/resources/article/brazilian-data-protection-law-lgpd-english-translation/) (“The
data subject has the right to request for the review of decisions made solely based on automated
processing of personal data affecting her/his interests, including decisions intended to define her/his
personal, professional, consumer and credit profile, or aspects of her/his personality.”).
210 LGPD, supra note X, at _ (“The data subject has the right to request for the review of decisions
made solely based on automated processing of personal data affecting her/his interests, including
decisions intended to define her/his personal, professional, consumer and credit profile, or aspects
of her/his personality.”).
211 Id. § 20(1) (“Whenever requested to do so, the controller shall provide clear and adequate
information regarding the criteria and procedures used for an automated decision, subject to
commercial and industrial secrecy.”).
212 Panama’s Law No. 81 on Personal Data Protection; GDPR art. 22(1).
213 CCPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.185(a)(16) (mandating that the Attorney General issue regulations
that businesses disclose “meaningful information about the logic involved in those decisionmaking
processes, as well as a description of the likely outcome of the process with respect to the consumer.”).
214 GDPR, art. 22(2).
215 GDPR, art. 13(2)(f) and 14(2)(g) use identical language about informing data subjects about “the
existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, referred to in Article 22(1) and (4) and,
at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance
and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.” See also id. art. 15(1)(h).
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problems caused by algorithmic decisionmaking.
2. Control of Inferences
The GDPR focuses on “automated” decisions, but automation is not really the key
feature of what makes certain decisions problematic. A more apt focus is on the
use of inference in decisions.216 Inference involves using existing data to generate
new data about a person or to make predictions about them. Inference, much more
than automation, is what the law should regulate.
In practice, it remains unclear how broadly the GDPR automated decisionmaking
right applies. As Aziz Huq points out, the GDPR leaves “[t]he precise range of
automated machine-learning tools captured by the prohibition . . . up for grabs.”217
Margot Kaminski and Jennifer Urban observe that the “GDPR’s right to
contestation exists largely for now as a standard, rather than a set of specific
procedural rules.”218 They further note that “Companies must allow individuals to
challenge an automated decision, but there are as of yet few details about what that
process must be.”219
Restrictions on automated decisionmaking can be limited because any human
involvement, even small, can make the right inapplicable, since the right involves
a decision is based “solely” on automated processing. Avishai Ostrin contends that
the right should be recrafted to “apply not only to decision-making algorithms but
also to decision-aiding algorithms.”220
Decisions made by humans based on data can be as problematic as automated
decisions - or even worse. Margot Kaminski notes that “adding a human in the
loop” could create problems, such as making “accuracy of the overall system worse,
thus negatively impacting other individuals subject to the algorithm.”221
Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst note that automated decisions can transform
bias in previous decisions into a “a formalized rule” that would have systematic
effects.222 To make matters worse, automated decisions are often mischaracterized
as being free from any human taint when, in fact, they are affected by humans. As
Ifeoma Ajunwa observes, “the human hand remains present in all automated
decision-making.”223 Algorithmic decisions are often viewed as “oracular
proclamations; they are accepted at face value without any attempt to analyze or
Alicia Solow-Niederman, Information Privacy and the Inference Economy,
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the loop will respect individual dignity but could make accuracy of the overall system worse, thus
negatively impacting other individuals subject to the algorithm.”).
221 Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic
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further interpret them.”224
Privacy law often addresses algorithmic decisionmaking superficially. A right for
individuals to correct data in their records is inadequate to address situations
where patterns in data might reflect biases, prejudice, and inequality.225 The
algorithm may be unobjectionable, and the data may be correct. But a problem
may exist because people’s behavior is based on prejudice. Data is no better than
the people and society that produces it.
Algorithmic decisions tend to ossify prejudices. As Anupam Chander observes,
“[a]lgorithms trained or operated on a real-world data set that necessary reflects
existing discrimination may well replicate that discrimination.”226 Algorithms can
amplify prejudice in existing data by using it in a widespread systematic way.
Providing people with a right to stop solely automated decisionmaking about them
is an insufficient response to these problems. Discriminatory algorithms do not
just affected isolated individuals; they are harmful to society.
Decisions should be reviewed for accuracy, fairness, as well as values. Regulation
of inferential decisionmaking could mandate review of the output of the inferential
logic. As Cathy O’Neil notes, data is often not gathered on those whom an
algorithm gets wrong.227 Algorithms can “generate their own reality” by reinforcing
their own decisions.228 O’Neil contends that “many poisonous assumptions are
camouflaged by math and go largely untested and unquestioned.”229
Of course, the algorithms might make better decisions than humans, but as
Barocas and Selbst argue, “victims of inaccurate determinations may find cold
comfort in the fact that certain decisions are rendered more reliably overall when
decision makers employ data mining.”230 Algorithms can shift who wins and loses
in certain types of decisions, but it does so in a way that is more permanent,
systematic, opaque, and unquestioned.231
Privacy rights often totally miss the mark when addressing the problems. Privacy
rights will focus on whether an individual’s records were correct, whether the
individual consented to the collection of her data, and so on. But the problem
cannot be solved on the individual level. For example, the rights that FCRA
provides ultimately do not challenge the FICO system of credit scoring. Individuals
can correct errors, but they have no input or recourse about the way judgments are
made about their credit. As long as individuals are given access and can correct
records, the consumer reporting agencies can largely make the judgments they
please. The law fails to address any problems and unfairness created by the
formulas that the consumer reporting agencies use.
The missing dimension is that the law fails to provide protections to ensure that
inferential decisions about people are made fairly, accurately, and consistently
Ajunwa, Paradox of Automation, supra note X, at 1688.
Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 133, 190 (2017).
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with important societal values. The law must bring the massive web of inferential
decisions about people under control, to address their skewed assumptions,
troubling output, amplification of prejudice, and their massive troubling effects on
society.

CONCLUSION
Although individual rights are an important part of privacy law, they are no match
for many privacy problems. Rights function at an individual level, with the onus
being on individuals to invoke them. Rights mainly function to give individuals the
ability to have some participation in the activities involving their data, but they are
not an effective way to regulate privacy. Far too often, however, privacy laws rely
heavily on rights as the primary engine of protecting privacy. Rights are ill-suited
for this role.
A small percentage of individuals might exercise a few rights, and they will perhaps
feel the illusion of empowerment. But they lack enough knowledge to be
empowered.
Rights are very limited in how much they can help a person, and they take a lot of
work to use. Effective regulation of privacy must be done more systematically at a
societal level in a way that does not put the onus on individuals.
Privacy law focuses on the surface. It looks at whether data is correct rather than
whether data leads to good judgments about people. It looks to whether formalities
were followed such as providing people with information rather than to whether
people are actually informed. It looks to whether people are provided with rights
to delete and correct rather than to whether organizations are engaging in data
minimization and data quality.
Rights are a convenient way to make it look like privacy is being protected. In
practice, rights become a set of chores that are nearly impossible to do at the
necessary scale. The failure of rights can then be blamed on individuals not caring
enough to exercise them.232
Privacy cannot be solved at the individual level. Rights should certainly be part of
privacy laws, but they can only play a small supportive role. Meaningful protection
must be large-scale and structural in nature.
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